Pembroke Hospital v. D.L., 122 N.E.3d 1058

D.L. was involuntarily admitted to Pembroke Hospital under G. L. c. 123, § 12(b) and Pembroke filed a timely petition under §§ 7–8 for continued commitment.
A District Court judge denied Pembroke’s petition, finding Pembroke had not proved likelihood of serious harm necessary for commitment.
Pembroke staff, unable to find family housing for D.L., purported to “discharge” him but immediately detained and transported him without consent to South Shore Hospital for a new § 12(a) evaluation.
South Shore made a § 12(a) admission and returned D.L. to Pembroke; Pembroke readmitted him under § 12(b) and filed a second §§ 7–8 petition.
D.L. moved to dismiss the second petition as jurisdictionally defective because Pembroke never restored his liberty after the first denial and thus misused § 12; the District Court denied the motion and ordered commitment for up to six months.
The Appellate Division affirmed; the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and reversed, vacating the second commitment order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of “discharge” under G. L. c. 123	“Discharge” requires restoration of liberty; Pembroke did not discharge D.L.	Pembroke contends it properly discharged D.L. while arranging a § 12 transport/evaluation	Court: “Discharge” means release from involuntary restraint; Pembroke did not discharge D.L.
Use of § 12 after judicial denial	Continued restraint and arranging a new § 12 evaluation was an “abuse or misuse” of § 12 because court had denied commitment	Pembroke argues it followed procedure by initiating a new § 12 evaluation at another facility due to safety/housing concerns	Court: Pembroke’s conduct was an abuse/misuse of § 12; subsequent admissions and petition were tainted
Jurisdiction to decide second §§7–8 petition	Because initial denial required release, subsequent proceedings based on continued restraint lacked jurisdictional basis	Pembroke contends actions complied with statute and regulations permitting § 12 process	Court: District Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the second petition because D.L. had not been lawfully released before the second § 12 admission
Mootness of appeal	D.L. retains a cognizable interest and the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review; not moot	Pembroke argues case is moot because D.L. was no longer in custody	Court: Not moot; review exercised due to ongoing collateral and public importance

Matter of E.C. 479 Mass. 113 (2018) (describing freedom from physical restraint as a paradigmatic fundamental right)
Williams v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC 480 Mass. 286 (2018) (G. L. c. 123 recognizes psychiatric patients' liberty interests)
O'Connor v. Donaldson 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (statutory procedures must respect psychiatric patients' liberty)
Guardianship of Doe 391 Mass. 614 (1984) (§ 12 is primary route for emergency involuntary commitment)
Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini 451 Mass. 777 (2008) (right to emergency hearing alleging abuse or misuse of § 12)
Thompson v. Commonwealth 386 Mass. 811 (1982) (state’s power to confine ends when conditions justifying confinement cease)
Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg 374 Mass. 271 (1978) (burden of proof for commitment findings)
Sullivan v. Brookline 435 Mass. 353 (2001) (statutory language given effect consistent with plain meaning and legislative aim)
Commonwealth v. Blake 454 Mass. 267 (2009) (confinement must cease once factfinder determines commitment standard not met)