Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. SEC. Admin.
896 F.3d 207
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiff Nadine Pellegrino was subjected to a private TSA screening at Philadelphia International Airport in 2006; interactions with Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) led to her arrest and later acquittal in criminal proceedings.
- Pellegrino sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for intentional torts (false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution) against the United States; the TSA denied her administrative claim.
- The FTCA generally bars intentional tort suits under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), but contains a "law enforcement proviso" waiving immunity for torts committed by "investigative or law enforcement officers" defined as officers "empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law."
- District Court granted summary judgment for the Government, concluding TSOs are not "investigative or law enforcement officers" under § 2680(h); Pellegrino appealed.
- The Third Circuit majority affirmed, holding TSOs perform administrative searches only and lack criminal law enforcement powers contemplated by the proviso; thus Pellegrino’s intentional-tort FTCA claims remain barred by sovereign immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TSA screeners (TSOs) qualify as "investigative or law enforcement officers" under the FTCA proviso (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)) | Pellegrino: TSOs "execute searches" by statute and regulation (screening includes physical searches/inspection), so they fit the proviso and FTCA waiver applies | Government: proviso targets traditional criminal law‑enforcement officers with powers to arrest/seize evidence; TSOs perform administrative, suspicionless screening and lack criminal enforcement powers | Held for Government: proviso limited to officers with criminal law‑enforcement powers; TSOs conduct administrative searches and do not qualify, so intentional-tort claims are barred by § 2680(h) exception to the FTCA waiver |
| Whether FTCA/other doctrines (statutory text, structure, history) support construal favoring plaintiff | Pellegrino/Dissent: plain statutory language covers "any officer ... empowered by law to execute searches"; TSA statutes/regulations empower TSOs to search and thus trigger proviso; ambiguity should be construed to allow waiver | Government/Majority: textual context, noscitur a sociis, FTCA structure (distinguishing "officers" vs "employees"), legislative history, agency statutes and practice show proviso meant for criminal enforcement actors; broad reading would expand liability drastically | Held: Majority adopts a limiting interpretation based on text+context+history; dissent would read proviso to cover TSOs and allow claims to go forward |
| Whether Vanderklok and other precedent foreclose Bivens or FTCA remedies in this context | Plaintiff: FTCA remedy should be available for intentional torts if proviso covers TSOs | Government: Vanderklok indicated TSOs are typically not law enforcement officers and special factors counsel against implying Bivens relief | Held: Vanderklok relevant but not dispositive on FTCA definitional question; court affirms dismissal of Bivens claims on special‑factors grounds and holds FTCA intentional‑tort claims barred because proviso does not apply |
| Whether other claims (FOIA, Privacy Act, state‑law emotional distress) survive | Pellegrino: asserted various supplemental claims | Government: FOIA exemptions, state law limits on IIED/NIED, procedural rulings | Held: District Court rulings on FOIA, Privacy Act, state‑law torts, and case‑management decisions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussed role of TSOs and declined to imply a Bivens remedy in airport‑security context)
- Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013) (interpreting the proviso’s scope; rejected narrow limiting readings of § 2680(h))
- Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004) (held administrative‑agency employees generally fall outside the law‑enforcement proviso)
- George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2013) (held airport screenings are permissible administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (treated TSA checkpoint searches as administrative/suspicionless checkpoint searches)
- Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006) (guidance on statutory interpretation and construing FTCA provisions)
- Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2018) (treated proviso broadly enough that an ATF chemist could fall within its terms)