Pelco Construction Company v. Chambers County, Texas, Kurt Amundson, and Amundson Consulting, Inc., 01-14-00317-CV

Chambers County contracted with Dannenbaum Engineering to design and manage rebuilding the Oak Island Fire Station after Hurricane Ike; Dannenbaum retained Amundson Consulting under a Staff Support Agreement to provide technical personnel.
Kurt Amundson worked for Amundson Consulting but acted under Dannenbaum’s supervision, used a Dannenbaum e‑mail, and was the primary Dannenbaum contact with bidders and contractor Pelco.
At a pre‑bid conference Dannenbaum representatives (including Amundson) discussed FEMA reimbursement and FEMA‑compliant design requirements; Pelco relied on that and later submitted the winning bid and entered an AIA form contract with Chambers County.
Chambers County temporarily suspended work (at the County’s direction) while amending the FEMA Project Worksheet; after FEMA approved the amendment Pelco refused to remobilize and issued a termination notice asserting a government order had stopped work.
Pelco sued Amundson (individually and his company) for fraud, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation; the trial court granted a take‑nothing summary judgment for Kurt Amundson and Amundson Consulting, and the appellees’ brief argues that judgment should be affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Individual liability of Kurt Amundson	Amundson made actionable misrepresentations in his individual capacity.	Amundson acted as an employee of Amundson Consulting under Dannenbaum’s control; corporate veil not pierced and no personal benefit shown.	Summary judgment for Amundson (no individual liability).
Fraud / negligent misrepresentation based on pre‑bid statements	Pelco relied on oral statements that FEMA funding was approved and in place to bid.	Oral statements contradicted or were merged into the written contract; contract did not make County payments contingent on FEMA reimbursement.	Summary judgment for Amundson (no actionable misrep).
Justifiable reliance / merger clause	Pelco says it relied on pre‑contract assurances about FEMA funding.	Merger/entire agreement clause bars reliance on prior oral statements that conflict with contract terms.	Merger clause defeats reliance; summary judgment for Amundson.
Causation / proximate cause of damages	Pelco claims reliance on statements caused its damages.	Pelco improperly terminated the contract; that termination was an intervening, proximate cause of its losses.	Pelco’s improper termination breaks causal chain; summary judgment for Amundson.

Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998) (mere breach of contract is not tortious fraud).
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment).
Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2006) (intervening cause can relieve original actor of liability).
DeClaire v. G & B Mcintosh Family Ltd. P’ship, 260 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (party cannot justifiably rely on statements that contradict express written agreement).
H2O Solutions, Ltd. v. PM Realty Grp., LP, 438 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (merger clauses can bar fraudulent‑inducement claims).
IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Eifert, 125 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (entire agreement clauses defeat pre‑contract oral modification/fraud claims).
Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Gulsby Eng'g, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (discussing merger clause and related contract‑integration issues).