Pedro Vega v. Charles Ryan
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9381
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Pedro Imperial Vega was convicted in Arizona of multiple counts of child sexual abuse based primarily on his stepdaughter B.’s testimony; he was sentenced to 28 years.
- B had earlier recanted her initial allegations to at least her mother and a Catholic priest, Father Daniel McLaughlin ("Father Dan"); those earlier recantations led to prior dismissals of charges in earlier proceedings.
- Two of Vega’s prior attorneys documented B’s recantation to Father Dan in the case file; Vega’s trial counsel (Darby) did not review those files and did not call Father Dan at trial.
- After conviction Vega moved for a new trial when Father Dan’s recantation testimony came to light; the state courts treated the priest’s testimony as not newly discovered or merely cumulative and denied relief; Arizona post-conviction relief was denied as well.
- Vega filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to review the client file and call Father Dan; the district court denied relief but granted COA on the IAC claim.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the state court unreasonably applied Strickland: counsel’s failure to read the file and to present Father Dan was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to review prior counsel’s file and interview/call Father Dan | Vega: counsel had a duty to review available files and call Father Dan; failure was deficient performance under Strickland | State: Vega or family knew of the recantation; counsel reasonably relied on the client and prior knowledge; priest testimony would be cumulative | Held for Vega: counsel’s failure to read the file and call Father Dan was objectively unreasonable (deficient) |
| Whether Vega suffered prejudice from counsel’s failure (Strickland prejudice prong) | Vega: Father Dan’s testimony was non-cumulative, undermined B’s credibility, and there was a reasonable probability of a different verdict | State: priest testimony would be cumulative to B’s testimony that she recanted to her mother; substantial corroborating evidence existed | Held for Vega: reasonable probability of a different outcome; state court’s finding of no prejudice was unreasonable |
| Whether state courts’ application of Strickland was entitled to AEDPA deference | Vega: state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent (Rompilla/Wiggins) when excusing counsel’s failure to investigate | State: state courts reasonably applied law and credited cumulative-evidence rationale | Held for Vega: AEDPA does not salvage the state courts’ unreasonable application of clearly established law |
| Appropriate federal habeas relief | Vega: writ should issue given IAC and prejudice | State: denial of relief appropriate | Held: reversed district court; remanded with instruction to grant habeas relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance + prejudice)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (counsel must examine readily available files; failure to do so can be deficient)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (counsel must investigate and present mitigating/exculpatory evidence if available)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA unreasonable-application standard explained)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 ("doubly deferential" review in Strickland-AEDPA context)
- Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.) (failure to investigate prior counsel’s file can be Strickland error)
- Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.) (failure to investigate and present recantation evidence prejudicial in a he-said/she-said trial)