Pedison USA, Inc. and Dickson Ewemade v. CNC Construction Inc.
02-16-00271-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 23, 2016Background
- CNC Construction (third-party plaintiff) filed third-party claims against Pedison USA and Ewemade (third-party defendants) in a Tarrant County suit.
- Appellants answered and filed pleas to the jurisdiction; 16 months later they moved to sever the third-party claims and transfer venue to Dallas County.
- The original plaintiff later dismissed its main suit, leaving only the third-party claims pending in the trial court.
- The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to sever and transfer venue after a hearing.
- Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal invoking Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003(c).
- The Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the interlocutory appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003(c) lies from denial of motion to sever/transfer third-party claims | Appellants asserted § 15.003(c) authorized interlocutory review of the venue ruling | Appellee (and court) argued § 15.003 applies only to suits with multiple plaintiffs, not third-party claims governed by § 15.062 | Court held § 15.003 is inapplicable; no statutory authority for interlocutory appeal, so dismissal for lack of jurisdiction |
| Proper venue rule for third-party claims | N/A (Appellants sought transfer to Dallas under general venue) | CNC relied on § 15.062 — venue of main action governs third-party claims | Court held § 15.062 controls: third-party venue follows the main action in Tarrant County |
| Whether a third-party plaintiff becomes a "plaintiff" for § 15.003 purposes | Appellants implicitly treated themselves as entitled to § 15.003 review | Appellee cited authority that a third-party plaintiff is a defendant suing a nonparty and not a "plaintiff" for § 15.003 | Court held a third-party plaintiff is not a "plaintiff" under § 15.003; the statute does not apply |
| Whether trial-court order denying severance is independently appealable | Appellants sought interlocutory review of severance/venue denial | Appellee argued no statute authorizes interlocutory appeal of such order | Court held there is no statutory right to interlocutory appeal here and dismissed the appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1988) (venue of main action controls venue of related claims)
- Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) (a third-party plaintiff is not a "plaintiff" for purposes of statutes addressing multiple plaintiffs)
- CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (appellate courts lack jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals absent statutory authorization)
- Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000) (no interlocutory appeal lies from a trial court's venue determination absent statute)
- In re County of Galveston, 211 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (section 15.062 governs third-party venue)