198 Conn.App. 233
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Michael R. Peck introduced former client Michael Longo to Peck’s law partner, leading Longo to lend $70,000 to the law firm in 2001; subsequent notes extended repayment into 2013 and Peck personally executed a 2008 note due in 2013.
- Longo filed a grievance in December 2011; a reviewing committee (April 26, 2013) found Peck violated Rule 1.8(a) by failing to advise Longo in writing to seek independent counsel and failing to obtain written consent, and ordered CLE in legal ethics.
- Peck sought review but expressly accepted the discipline and waived any Superior Court appeal; the Statewide Grievance Committee denied his request (June 21, 2013) and Peck did not appeal.
- After the Supreme Court’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder (announcing a mandatory six‑year time limit in Practice Book §2‑32(a)(2)(E)), Peck (in 2017) moved the Committee to vacate the 2013 sanction; the Committee declined to act and refused reconsideration.
- Peck appealed the Committee’s 2017 refusals to the Superior Court; the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning Peck’s filings were an improper attempt to relitigate the 2013 decision he had waived and failed to timely appeal.
- The Appellate Court affirmed: the six‑year Practice Book limit is mandatory but not jurisdictional under §51‑90 et seq., and Peck’s 2017 motions/appeal were an impermissible end‑run (nonjusticiable collateral attack) on the final 2013 order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the six‑year limit in Practice Book §2‑32(a)(2)(E) is subject‑matter jurisdictional | Elder makes the §2‑32 six‑year limit jurisdictional and thus the Committee lacked jurisdiction over the 2011 grievance | §2‑32’s time limit is mandatory but rules of practice cannot strip statutory grant of jurisdiction under §51‑90 et seq. | The six‑year limit is mandatory but not jurisdictional; it does not deprive the Committee of subject‑matter jurisdiction |
| Whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to review the Committee’s 2017 refusals to vacate/reconsider | Peck timely appealed the Committee’s 2017 refusal and thus the court had jurisdiction to grant relief | Peck’s 2017 motions were an attempt to relitigate the 2013 final order he had waived and failed to appeal; no procedure authorizes vacatur years later | The appeal was nonjusticiable; the court lacked jurisdiction to afford relief because the filings were an improper attempt to circumvent the waiver/failure to appeal |
| Whether the Committee lacked jurisdiction over Longo’s 2011 grievance due to the six‑year bar | The underlying grievance alleged misconduct older than six years, so the Committee lacked jurisdiction | The legislature’s grievance statutes (§51‑90 et seq.) contain no time bar; practice‑book limits do not alter statutory jurisdiction | The Committee had jurisdiction under statutory authority; the Practice Book limit does not negate that jurisdiction |
| Whether the Committee’s refusal to vacate is an appealable final judgment or within Committee’s inherent authority to reopen | The Committee’s refusal to vacate is a final, reviewable act especially if the original order was void for lack of jurisdiction | No rule permits a delayed motion to vacate; the refusal is effectively a non‑reviewable procedural act when used to relitigate a final order | The refusal to vacate was not a reviewable substitute for the timely appeal Peck waived; appealing that refusal was an impermissible end‑run and nonjusticiable |
Key Cases Cited
- Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder, 325 Conn. 378 (Conn. 2017) (held Practice Book §2‑32(a)(2)(E) six‑year limitation is mandatory for screening grievances)
- Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258 (Conn. 2001) (mandatory filing limits need not be treated as subject‑matter jurisdictional)
- Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2007) (justiciability doctrines govern court review of grievance committee matters)
- Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 309 Conn. 840 (Conn. 2013) (analysis of collateral‑attack principles and impermissible attempts to relitigate final judgments)
- Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228 (Conn. 1990) (Superior Court’s inherent supervisory authority to review attorney discipline)
- Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, 329 Conn. 515 (Conn. 2018) (court cannot provide relief when a challenge is functionally an impermissible collateral attack)