Pearson v. United Automobile Workers International Union
694 F. App'x 401
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Timothy Pearson was fired by Ford in 2006; his union filed a grievance and pursued it through the contractual grievance process, culminating in arbitration in October 2008, where the arbitrator upheld the termination.
- Pearson alleges Ford made a favorable settlement offer to the Union in 2008 that the Union did not communicate to him; he claims he would have accepted it and avoided arbitration.
- The Union’s constitution provides a multi-stage internal appeals process (initial, intermediate, and final bodies such as the PRB or CAC) that members must exhaust before suing the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation.
- Pearson did not use the Union’s internal appeals process; he filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB (dismissed) and later sued the Union under § 301 of the LMRA for breach of the duty of fair representation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Union on grounds including failure to exhaust internal remedies; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Pearson failed to show any exception that would excuse exhaustion (standing, jurisdiction, inadequate relief, or unreasonable delay).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pearson was required to exhaust internal union remedies before suing for breach of the duty of fair representation | Pearson argued exhaustion should be excused due to exceptions (hostility, inadequacy, delay); he contends internal remedies were unavailable or inadequate | Union argued Pearson failed to exhaust and offered no basis to excuse exhaustion under Clayton | Held: Exhaustion required; Pearson failed to show any exception to excuse his non‑exhaustion |
| Standing to pursue internal appeals | Pearson claimed he lacked standing in 2012 because records showed inactive status and no dues payments | Union showed members remain members for life unless they affirmatively withdraw; inactive status does not bar appeals | Held: Pearson had standing; inactive membership does not preclude use of internal appeals |
| Whether the Union’s internal appeals bodies (PRB/CAC) had jurisdiction over failure-to-communicate settlement claims | Pearson argued PRB/CAC would lack jurisdiction or would not consider settlement communication part of grievance "processing" | Union pointed to constitution language allowing challenges to actions or failures to act in processing grievances; PRB jurisdiction includes processing and irrational conduct | Held: PRB/CAC plausibly had jurisdiction; failure-to-communicate fits within "processing of a grievance" and constitutional jurisdictional language |
| Whether internal appeals could provide full relief or would unreasonably delay judicial review | Pearson argued the internal process could not award full relief (back pay, retirement, emotional damages) and would unreasonably delay relief (multi-year lag) | Union showed initial/intermediate bodies and CAC can award monetary relief; the multi-stage process typically takes months to a few years and is not per se unreasonable | Held: Internal appeals could provide monetary relief; timing did not constitute unreasonable delay—no excuse for non‑exhaustion |
Key Cases Cited
- Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (requires exhaustion of internal union remedies and permits limited exceptions)
- Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (refuses to excuse exhaustion under the UAW appeals process; guides analysis of delay and adequacy)
- Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1979) (discusses delay but pre-dates Clayton; treated as non-controlling dictum in exhaustion analysis)