CLAYTON υ. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, ET AL.
No. 80-5049
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 4, 1981—Decided May 26, 1981
451 U.S. 679
*Together with No. 80-54, ITT Gilfillan, a Division of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Clayton, also on certiorari to the same court.
Everett F. Meiners argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 80-54. John T. McTernan, by appointment of the Court, 449 U. S. 1008, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-5049 and respondent in No. 80-54. With him on the briefs was Elizabeth B. Spector.
M. Jay Whitman argued the cause for respondents in No. 80-5049. With him on the brief were John A. Fillion and Lawrence Rosenzweig.†
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
An employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement between his union and employer must attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by that agreement before he may maintain a suit against his union or employer under
I
After eight years in the employ of ITT Gilfillan, Clifford E. Clayton, a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and a shop steward of its Local 509, was dismissed for violating a plant rule prohibiting defined misbehavior. Pursuant to the mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure established by the collective-bargaining agreement between ITT and Local 509, Clayton asked his union representative to file a grievance on his behalf on the ground that his dismissal was not for just cause. The union investigated Clayton‘s charges, pursued his grievance through the third step of the grievance procedure, and made a timely request for arbitration.1 It then withdrew the request, choosing not to proceed to arbitration. Clayton was notified of the union‘s decision after the time for requesting arbitration had expired.2
The UAW requires every union member “who feels aggrieved by any action, decision, or penalty imposed upon
Clayton did not file a timely internal appeal from his local‘s decision not to seek arbitration of his grievance.3 Instead, six months after the union‘s withdrawal of its request for arbitration, Clayton filed this action under
Both the union and the employer pleaded as an affirmative defense Clayton‘s failure to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures. App. 12, 18. The District Court sustained this defense, finding that Clayton had failed to exhaust the
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Clayton‘s suit against the union and reversed the dismissal of his suit against the employer. 623 F. 2d 563 (1980). Focusing on the adequacy of the relief available under the internal union appeals procedures the Court of Appeals held that Clayton‘s failure to exhaust was fatal to his claim against the union, because by filing an internal appeal Clayton might have received money damages, the relief he sought in his § 301 suit against the union. Id., at 566. However, the Court held that Clayton‘s failure to exhaust did not bar his suit against the employer, because the internal appeals procedures could not result in either reinstatement of his job, which was the relief Clayton sought from the employer under § 301, or in reactivation of his grievance. Id., at 569-570.
In No. 80-5049, Clayton argues that his § 301 claim against the UAW and Local 509 should be allowed to proceed despite his failure to exhaust internal union procedures. In No. 80-54, ITT Gilfillan argues that if Clayton‘s failure to exhaust bars his suit against the union, it must also bar his suit against the employer.
The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether an employee should be required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures before bringing suit against a union or employer under § 301. Some hold that the employee‘s failure to exhaust internal union procedures may not be asserted as a defense by an employer.5 Others permit the defense to be
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 449 U. S. 950 (1980). We reverse the dismissal of Clayton‘s suit against the union and affirm the reversal of the dismissal of his suit against the employer. We hold that where an internal union appeals procedure cannot result in reactivation of the employee‘s grievance or an award of the complete relief sought in his § 301 suit, exhaustion will not be required with respect to either the suit against the employer or the suit against the union.
II
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965), we were asked to decide whether an employee alleging a vio-
The contractual procedures we required the employee to exhaust in Republic Steel are significantly different from the procedures at issue here. In these cases, the Court is asked to require exhaustion of internal union procedures. These procedures are wholly a creation of the UAW Constitution. They were not bargained for by the employer and union and are nowhere mentioned in the collective-bargaining agreement that Clayton seeks to have judicially enforced.12 Nonetheless, Clayton‘s employer and union contend that exhaustion of the UAW procedures, like exhaustion of contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, will further national labor policy and should be required as a matter of federal common law. Their argument, in brief, is that an exhaustion requirement will enable unions to regulate their internal affairs without undue judicial interference and that it will also promote the broader goal of encouraging private resolution of disputes arising out of a collective-bargaining agreement.
We do not agree that the policy of forestalling judicial interference with internal union affairs is applicable to these
Our analysis, then, focuses on that aspect of national labor policy that encourages private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over collective-bargaining agreements. Concededly, a requirement that aggrieved employees exhaust internal remedies might lead to nonjudicial resolution of some contractual grievances. For example, an employee who exhausts internal union procedures might decide not to pursue his § 301 action in court, either because the union offered him a favorable settlement, or because it demonstrated that his underlying contractual claim was without merit. However, we decline to impose a universal exhaustion requirement lest employees with meritorious § 301 claims be forced to exhaust themselves and their resources by submitting their claims to potentially lengthy internal union procedures that may not be adequate to redress their underlying grievances.
As we stated in NLRB v. Marine Workers, supra, at 426, and n. 8, courts have discretion to decide whether to require exhaustion of internal union procedures. In exercising this discretion, at least three factors should be relevant: first, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee‘s grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee‘s opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may properly excuse the employee‘s failure to exhaust.
Clayton has not challenged the finding of the lower courts that the UAW internal appeals procedures are fair and reasonable. He concedes that he could have received an impar-
In his suit under § 301, Clayton seeks reinstatement from his employer and monetary relief from both his employer and his union.15 Although, the UAW Constitution does not indicate on its face what relief is available through the internal union appeals procedures,16 the parties have stipulated that the Public Review Board can award backpay in an appropriate case, Tr. 35-36, and the two decisions of the Public Review Board reprinted in the joint appendix both resulted in awards of backpay. App. 89-109. It is clear, then, that at least some monetary relief may be obtained through the internal appeals procedures.17
Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of his grievance, exhaustion would advance the national labor policy of encouraging private resolution of contractual labor disputes. In such cases, the internal union procedures are capable of fully resolving meritorious claims short of the judicial forum. Thus, if the employee received the full relief he requested through internal procedures, his § 301 action would become moot, and he would not be entitled to a judicial hearing. Similarly, if the employee obtained reactivation of his grievance through internal union procedures, the policies underlying Republic Steel would come into play,20 and the employee would be required to submit his claim to the collectively bargained dispute-resolution procedures.21 In either case, exhaustion of internal remedies could result in final resolution of the employee‘s contractual grievance through private rather than judicial avenues.
III
In contrast to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, which are negotiated by the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement and are generally designed to provide
We conclude that the policies underlying Republic Steel are furthered by an exhaustion requirement only where the internal union appeals procedures can either grant the aggrieved employee full relief or reactivate his grievance. For only in those circumstances is there a reasonable possibility that the employee‘s claim will be privately resolved. If the internal procedures are not adequate to effect that relief, the employee should not be required to expend time and resources seeking a necessarily incomplete resolution of his claim prior to pursuing judicial relief. If the internal procedures are inadequate, the employee‘s failure to exhaust should be excused, and he should be permitted to pursue his claim for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of the collective-bargaining agreement in court under § 301.
In this case, the internal union appeals panels cannot reactivate Clayton‘s grievance and cannot grant Clayton the reinstatement relief he seeks under § 301. We therefore hold that Clayton should not have been required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures prior to bringing suit against his union and employer under § 301.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE REHNQUIST‘s dissent, and write briefly to
In briefest summary, I would hold that in the circumstances of this case no issue concerning the breach of the union‘s statutory duty of fair representation properly can be said to arise at all. The union has not made a final determination whether to pursue arbitration on Clayton‘s behalf. Clayton should not be able to claim a breach of duty by the union until the union has had a full opportunity to make this determination. No such opportunity exists until Clayton exhausts the procedures available for resolving that question. Thus, as Clayton cannot claim a breach of duty by the union, he cannot bring a breach of contract suit under § 301 against his employer.
In my view, the asserted distinction in a tripartite case such as this one between contractual and internal union remedies, ante, at 687, is immaterial. The situation presented in this case is well within the doctrine underlying Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965), that employees must pursue all procedures established for determining whether a union will go forward with a grievance. Employees must pursue available procedures even if the collective-bargaining agreement contains time limits that appear on their face to bar revival of the grievance. As the Court noted in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 556-557 (1964), “[q]uestions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by it.” Therefore, “it best accords with the usual purposes of an arbitration clause and with the policy behind federal labor law to regard procedural disagreements not as separate disputes but as aspects of the
*Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae 3-4, 5-14.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEWART, and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defense of exhaustion of internal union remedies was available to the union defendant in this § 301 action but not to the employer defendant. The result of this ruling was to put the employer in the unenviable position of having to defend the manner in which the union represented one of its employees (Clayton) during a grievance procedure. The Court‘s opinion today rights what I view as the principal error in the decision below by requiring the actions against the employer and union to proceed simultaneously. Ante, at 695. The Court reaches this conclusion by holding that in this particular case the exhaustion defense should not be available to either the union or employer. I, however, view differently than does the Court the benefits to be obtained from requiring exhaustion in these cases, and would require Clayton to exhaust his intraunion remedies before proceeding against either his union or employer.
The Court does not require exhaustion of internal union remedies in this case because it finds the remedies cannot provide Clayton with all the substantive relief he seeks (i. e., money damages and reinstatement) or with reactivation of his grievance. Ante, at 693. The Court, however, concedes that where the internal remedies can provide such relief, the exhaustion defense should be available to the employer and union alike. Ante, at 692, and 20 Presumably, this would require exhaustion in a § 301 case where the only relief sought was money damages and money damages were obtainable through the internal union procedures. In such a case, the employee would be able to obtain all “the substantive relief he seeks.” Ante, at 693.
The second prong of the Court‘s test is “whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee‘s grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301 . . . .” Ibid. Exhaustion is not required in this case, the Court says, because the UAW‘s internal union appeals procedures cannot provide Clayton with reinstatement or reactivation of his grievance.
However, no prior case of this Court has held that exhaustion should not be required unless the internal union remedies can provide all the substantive relief requested or reactivation of the grievance. The principal difficulty with the Court‘s opinion lies in its framing of this second criterion which reflects much too narrow a view of the purposes of the exhaustion defense and the benefits which will likely result from requiring exhaustion in a case where a union has established a means for reviewing the manner in which it has represented an employee during a grievance. It is worth noting that neither NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U. S. 418 (1968), on which the Court so heavily relies, nor any other case of this Court, supports the language used by the Court in the second prong of its test. In fact, Marine Workers simply states exhaustion should not be required “when the administrative remedies are inadequate.” Id., at 426, n. 8. Our focus therefore should be on the adequacies of the union remedies when viewed in the context of the underlying purpose of the exhaustion defense—which is to encourage private rather than judicial resolution of disputes.
The error in the Court‘s analysis results in part from its
An additional question which is also of great importance is whether a union should ever be found to have breached its duty of fair representation when a union member shuns an appeals procedure which is both mandated by the union constitution and established for the purpose of allowing the union to satisfy its duty of fair representation. It seems to me not at all unreasonable to say that a union should have the right to require its members to give it the first opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Responsible union self-government demands a fair opportunity to function. This is especially true in a situation such as here where exhaustion of the union remedies could eliminate the need to litigate altogether. Congress has recognized the importance of these values in
“No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or any proceeding before any administrative agency . . . Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof . . . .”
Section 101 (a) (4) reflects what I believe to be the reasonable compromise Congress reached when trying to balance two somewhat competing interests—furtherance of the national labor policy in favor of private resolution of disputes on the one hand and the desire not to unduly burden or “exhaust” an individual employee with time-consuming procedures on the other. It is fair to say that § 101 (a) (4) represents Congress’ judgment that limiting access to the courts for at least four months is not an unreasonable price to pay in exchange for the previously mentioned benefits exhaustion may provide.“a statement of policy that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their discretion stay their hands for four months, while the aggrieved person seeks relief within the union. We read it, in other words, as installing in this labor field a regime comparable to that which prevails in other areas of law before the federal courts, which often stay their hands while a litigant seeks administrative relief before the appropriate agency.” 391 U. S., at 426.
The language of § 101 (a) (4) also goes a long way to satisfy the third prong of the test set forth by the Court today. Exhaustion of internal union procedures should not be required where such would unreasonably delay an employee‘s opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. Ante, at 689. Intraunion procedures which take years to complete serve no worthwhile purpose in the overall scheme of promoting the prompt and private resolution of claims. But a requirement that an employee not be per-
Notes
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”
Moreover, exhaustion would not adversely affect the employee:“[It] complements the union‘s status as exclusive bargaining representative by permitting [the union] to participate actively in the continuing administration of the contract. In addition, conscientious handling of grievance claims will enhance the union‘s prestige with employees. Employer interests, for their part, are served by limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees.” 379 U. S., at 653.
ployee until the employee has attempted to implement the procedures and found them so.” Ibid. We concluded that since an employee bringing a § 301 claim is asserting rights created by a collective-bargaining agreement, he should also be required to pursue the dispute-resolution procedures created by that agreement. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S., at 562-563; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 184 (1967).“[I]t cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved em-
“No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, . . . Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal . . . proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof . . . .”
Although most collective-bargaining agreements contain similarly strict time limits for seeking arbitration of grievances, there are some exceptions. The UAW informs us that “[s]ome employers and unions have, through collective bargaining, agreed to allow the reinstatement of withdrawn grievances where a union tribunal reverses the union‘s initial decision. This is true, for example, in the current UAW contracts with the major automobile and agricultural implement manufacturers.” Brief for Respondents in No. 80-5049, p. 18, n. 40. In such cases, the relief available through the union‘s internal appeal procedures would presumably be adequate.
“The UAW‘s liability (if any) for breach of its duty of fair representation
would depend on the reasons for the union‘s withdrawal of the arbitration request. There is little in the record to indicate why the local official changed his mind and withdrew the arbitration request. But the missing motive is precisely the sort of information that an appellate body within the union would have elicited, compiling a record that would greatly assist the court now.” 623 F. 2d, at 566 (emphasis added).
There are three reasons why we are not persuaded by this analysis. First, the record does indicate why the union withdrew its request for arbitration of Clayton‘s grievance. The letter from Local 509‘s International Representative to Clayton, informing him that the union had withdrawn its request for arbitration, listed five reasons in support of the union‘s decision. See 2 supra. Second, since the UAW Constitution does not on its face require any of the decisionmaking panels of the union to explain the reasons underlying their disposition of an employee‘s internal union appeal, there is no guarantee that exhaustion will result in a useful interpretation of union rules. Third, in many cases the union tribunal is not permitted to consider certain allegations the employee could assert under § 301. In these cases, for example, Clayton alleges that the union “acted arbitrarily and discriminatorily” in refusing to seek arbitration of his grievance. App. 6 (emphasis added). The UAW Constitution, however, states that the Public Review Board can only consider allegations that the employee‘s grievance “was improperly handled [by the union] because of fraud, discrimination, or collusion with management.” Art. 33, § 8 (b) (emphasis added). This standard offers the aggrieved employee less protection than the “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith” standard for breach of the duty of fair representation that we developed in Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 190. As the General Counsel to the Public Review Board has stated:
See also Johnson v. General Motors, 641 F. 2d, at 1081. Of course, if an allegation cannot be considered by the Public Review Board, no record helpful to a court will be made with respect to that issue. In sum, we conclude that the prospect that exhaustion would create a record helpful to a court in a subsequent § 301 action is too speculative to be given much weight.“The UAW acknowledges that it has a duty of fair representation to its members. Moreover, it acknowledges that its members may assert a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation within the system of internal remedies. It does not concede to its members, however, that arbitrary, perfunctory, or negligent conduct amounts to a breach of the duty of fair representation, nor does it permit them even to assert this type of claim before the PRB, since the standard of review is jurisdictional. That is, unless the requisite claim is made (fraud, discrimination, or collusion) the board may not entertain it.” Klein, supra, at 99.
