Pearlie Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., Ky., 25 F.4th 391

On June 29, 2016, Jessie Mills took his two-year-old daughter from her grandparents and walked down the middle of a dark road; deputies Mikey Ashurst and Brandon Bolton pursued to recover the child.
Officers ordered Mills to stop; a fall occurred (disputedly caused by a flashlight blow or a taser cartridge), and the child was recovered.
A prolonged, violent physical encounter followed: officers tased and struck Mills repeatedly; witnesses and officers disagree whether Mills actively resisted.
Ashurst then shot and killed Mills; witnesses conflict about whether Mills charged at Ashurst or took only a step or two while largely nonthreatening.
Mills’s mother (Gambrel) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and state law; district court granted summary judgment to the officers and Knox County and dismissed state-law claims without prejudice.
Sixth Circuit: affirmed qualified immunity for the officers’ initial force to recover the child and affirmed summary judgment for Knox County on Monell failure-to-train; reversed as to the five-minute beating and the shooting (material factual disputes remain) and remanded; also reversed dismissal of state-law claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Initial use of force to recover child (taser/flashlight blow)	Force was excessive and unconstitutional	Officers had probable cause to believe a serious felony (kidnapping) and could use force to recover child	Officers entitled to qualified immunity for initial force — a reasonable officer could have believed it lawful
2. Five-minute struggle (repeated strikes, taser use)	Evidence (Hobbs) shows gratuitous beating of nonresisting Mills; unconstitutional	Officers say Mills violently resisted, justifying force	Genuine dispute of material fact (Hobbs’s account must be credited at summary judgment); cannot grant qualified immunity — trial required
3. Fatal shooting by Ashurst	Under Hobbs’s version, Mills was nondangerous/unarmed and only stepped toward Ashurst; shooting unlawful	Officers and other witnesses say Mills charged aggressively after threatening to "hurt" them; deadly force reasonable	Shooting cannot be resolved on summary judgment because of disputed facts; qualified immunity denied at this stage for Ashurst
4. Knox County Monell claim (failure to train/supervise Ashurst)	County failed to train/supervise, allowing excessive-force misconduct	County relied on academy training; no pattern of similar violations and single-incident theory fails where misconduct is obviously unlawful	County entitled to summary judgment: no deliberate indifference or causation shown for single-incident municipal liability

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (objective video can blatantly contradict plaintiff’s account so no reasonable jury could believe it)
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (on summary judgment courts must view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force test: balance government interests, suspect’s interests; consider severity of crime, threat posed, and resistance)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permissible only if officer has probable cause to believe subject poses serious physical harm)
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021) (plaintiff must identify closely analogous precedent to overcome qualified immunity except in obvious cases)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity two-step; courts may address either prong first)
Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2006) (gratuitous post-neutralization beating violates clearly established rights; plaintiff’s version credited at summary judgment)
Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 1998) (deadly force unlawful under plaintiff’s version where an unarmed, nonthreatening subject was shot)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a municipal policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (municipal deliberate indifference standard and need for pattern except in narrow circumstances)