PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.
139 S. Ct. 2051
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- PDR (publisher of the Physicians' Desk Reference) sent a fax offering free e‑book copies to healthcare providers; Carlton & Harris sued in federal district court alleging a TCPA violation for an "unsolicited advertisement."
- The TCPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" but delegates implementing regulation authority to the FCC; in 2006 the FCC issued an Order treating faxes that "promote goods or services even at no cost" (e.g., free subscriptions) as unsolicited advertisements.
- The District Court ruled for PDR, concluding the fax was not an unsolicited advertisement and that it was not bound to follow the FCC Order.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the Hobbs Act's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the courts of appeals required district courts to adopt FCC interpretations of covered final orders.
- The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit and remanded, identifying two unresolved preliminary questions (whether the 2006 FCC Order is a binding "legislative rule" or only an interpretive guidance; and whether PDR had a prior and adequate opportunity for judicial review under the Hobbs Act/APA) and declining to decide the broader Hobbs Act question.
- Separate concurring opinions: Justice Thomas (joined by Gorsuch) stressed constitutional concerns with treating agency interpretations as binding law; Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch) would have decided the main question and concluded district courts may review and reject agency statutory interpretations in enforcement actions absent clear Congressional preclusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's (Carlton) Argument | Defendant's (PDR) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Hobbs Act requires district courts in TCPA enforcement suits to accept FCC statutory interpretations | Hobbs Act's "exclusive jurisdiction" grants courts of appeals sole power to "determine the validity" of FCC orders, so district courts may not reject FCC interpretations | Hobbs Act does not expressly preclude as‑applied challenges in enforcement suits; district courts may interpret statutes and reject agency readings | Court did not decide; vacated Fourth Circuit and remanded so the court of appeals can address preliminary questions first |
| Whether the FCC's 2006 Order is a binding "legislative rule" (force of law) or an "interpretive rule" (nonbinding guidance) | Carlton relied on the FCC Order as authoritative to classify PDR's fax as an unsolicited advertisement | PDR argued the Order is interpretive or otherwise not binding on district courts | Court identified this as a necessary preliminary issue for the Fourth Circuit to decide on remand |
| Whether PDR had a "prior and adequate" opportunity to obtain judicial review under the Hobbs Act / APA §703 (i.e., whether failure to seek review in the 60‑day window precludes as‑applied challenges now) | Carlton/Government argued the Hobbs Act's 60‑day review window channels review to courts of appeals and forecloses later challenges | PDR argued the APA preserves as‑applied review in enforcement proceedings unless Congress clearly made pre‑enforcement review exclusive and adequate | Court held this is a threshold question to be addressed on remand and did not resolve it |
| Whether a district court's disagreement with an agency interpretation in an enforcement suit "determines the validity" of an FCC order (thus violating Hobbs Act exclusivity) | Carlton argued any district court rejection effectively determines validity and intrudes on Hobbs Act exclusivity | PDR argued a district court ruling in an enforcement case does not enter a judgment affecting the FCC order's validity or enjoin the agency, so it does not violate Hobbs Act exclusivity | Majority indicated this issue depends on the preliminary questions and remanded; concurrences argued district courts may adjudicate statutory meaning in enforcement suits absent clear preclusion |
Key Cases Cited
- Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (agency rules v. interpretive guidance distinction)
- Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. 92 (interpretive rule definition)
- Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (agency rule authority)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (deference framework for agency statutory interpretations)
- Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (facial, pre‑enforcement review doctrine)
- Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (preclusion of as‑applied review in wartime statute interpreted narrowly)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (judicial duty to "say what the law is")
- Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (as‑applied challenges in enforcement proceedings)
- United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (SEC enforcement and statutory interpretation in litigation)
- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (SEC rule interpretation in enforcement context)