Paula Segura and Ricardo Segura v. State of Iowa
2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1
| Iowa | 2017Background
- Paula and Ricardo Segura alleged medical-malpractice and loss-of-consortium claims arising from events of May 12, 2009, and retained attorney Daniel D. Bernstein in April 2010.
- On May 12, 2011 Bernstein filed the State Appeal Board claim forms in triplicate, signing the claimants’ signature lines himself and adding "per POA," but did not attach any power-of-attorney document.
- The Board denied the claims in February 2012; the Seguras sued in district court in August 2012.
- The State moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing the ITCA and Board rule 543—1.3(3) require claimants’ personal signatures (or proof of POA) and thus the claims were not properly presented.
- The district court and Iowa Court of Appeals agreed; this court granted review and reversed, holding a claim is properly presented when a writing discloses sufficient information for the board to investigate and states the damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a tort claim is "properly presented" under the ITCA when the claimant did not personally sign the Board form but the form identified the claim, facts, damages, and was signed by the claimant’s attorney (with "per POA" notation) | Segura: attorney may file and sign on client’s behalf; strict adherence to every administrative formality is not required if the Board received sufficient information to investigate | State: Board rule 543—1.3(3) requires claimant’s signature (or proof of POA); failure to comply deprives courts of jurisdiction (failure to exhaust) | Held: Proper presentment requires a writing that (1) discloses the facts sufficient for the Board to investigate and (2) states the amount of damages; signature/verification rules are claim-processing requirements, not jurisdictional preconditions; the Seguras’ claims were properly presented |
| Whether administrative rules promulgated under Iowa Code § 669.3 can convert Board form requirements (e.g., signature/verification) into jurisdictional prerequisites for filing suit under § 669.5 | Segura: § 669.3 authorizes rules for processing/investigation but does not redefine the statutory presentment/exhaustion jurisdictional test in § 669.5 | State: § 669.3 and Board rules establish mandatory content (including signature/verification) of a claim; noncompliance means no proper presentment and no jurisdiction | Held: The court held the legislative presentment/exhaustion requirement stems from § 669.5 and the Board’s rulemaking authority under § 669.3 is limited to handling/processing/investigation; administrative form requirements alone do not divest courts of jurisdiction if the Board received sufficient information to investigate |
| Whether Foss/Voss (capacity-to-sue cases) or FTCA analogues control the outcome when an attorney signs a claimant’s form without attaching POA | Segura: different; no allegation claimant lacked capacity; attorney authority and procedural rules permit counsel to file; federal FTCA practice supports a minimal-presentment standard | State: Foss/Voss require capacity/verification at time of filing; attorney signature without proof of POA is inadequate | Held: Foss is distinguishable (concerned claimant capacity); court found persuasive federal FTCA line holding presentment requires notice sufficient to investigate and a sum-certain damages claim; attorney signature/absence of POA here did not defeat presentment where Board could investigate |
Key Cases Cited
- Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 2006) (courts have inherent power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1989) (Board prescribes form and content of tort claims; filing requirement interpreted)
- McGruder v. State, 420 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1988) (a claim is "made" when received, not merely mailed)
- Schneider v. State, 789 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 2010) (Board denial after investigation may show the Board had necessary information; avoid hypertechnical exhaustion dismissal)
- McFadden v. Dep’t of Transp., 877 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 2016) (favor resolving on merits over strict formality; exhaustive administrative compliance is jurisdictional but rules balanced against substantial-justice considerations)
- In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878 (Iowa 1996) (improper presentment can deprive courts of jurisdiction; presentment intended to permit prompt investigation and settlement)
- Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974) (exhaustion via administrative process is a condition precedent to suit)
- Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1986) (section 669.5 requires submission to agency and final decision or six months' passage before suit)
- GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (FTCA presentment requires a written statement sufficient for agency investigation and a sum-certain damages claim; distinguishes presentment from claims-processing)