Paula Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11188
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- Jensen defaulted on a Bank of America credit card; Midland Funding bought the debt and obtained a New Jersey Superior Court default judgment for $5,965.82.
- Pressler & Pressler, retained by Midland, served an information subpoena and written questions to Jensen to aid collection.
- The subpoena form required a clerk-of-court signature; Pressler typed the name "Terrence D. Lee" on the clerk signature line, though Lee was not a Superior Court clerk.
- Jensen knew Lee was not the Superior Court clerk, called the subpoena "fraudulent," but still answered the questions; her motion to vacate the judgment was denied.
- Jensen sued in federal court under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (FDCPA) alleging the false clerk signature made the subpoena a false or deceptive communication; the District Court granted summary judgment to Pressler and Midland.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that immaterial technical misstatements do not violate § 1692e because materiality is subsumed in the "least sophisticated debtor" standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1692e requires that a false statement be material to be actionable | Jensen: Any false representation (Lee's name) violates § 1692e, no separate materiality requirement | Collectors: § 1692e requires materiality; immaterial technical errors are not actionable | Court: Materiality is required; it is subsumed within the least sophisticated debtor standard |
| Whether the subpoena falsely represented itself as a court-authorized document in violation of § 1692e(9) | Jensen: Incorrect clerk name rendered the subpoena invalid and falsely represented court authorization | Collectors: Under NJ practice the clerk name/signature is a formality; the subpoena was not rendered invalid and was not misleading | Court: Error was not material and did not render the subpoena invalid or misrepresent its source; no § 1692e(9) violation |
| Whether attorney-collected communications warrant stricter scrutiny because of lawyer status | Jensen: Pressler used attorney status to give subpoena undue weight | Collectors: This was a routine use of a valid subpoena form, not coercive attorney misconduct | Court: No improper use of attorney status here; heightened-scrutiny cases involve different abuses |
| Whether materiality is a jury question precluding summary judgment | Jensen: Materiality can be mixed fact/law and should go to a jury | Collectors: Error is immaterial as a matter of law; summary judgment appropriate | Court: No reasonable juror could find the error material; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 556 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009) (false statements must be assessed through the eyes of the unsophisticated consumer)
- Hahn v. Triumph P'ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2009) (adopts materiality requirement for § 1692e)
- Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (materiality functions as corollary to least-sophisticated-consumer inquiry)
- Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985) (FDCPA claims judged from least sophisticated debtor perspective)
- McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2014) (collectors responsible for what the least sophisticated debtor would understand)
- Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (explains least sophisticated debtor standard preserves basic reasonableness)
- Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2006) (FDCPA remedial purpose and broad construction)
- Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank, 780 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2015) (materiality defined by capacity to affect least sophisticated consumer's decisionmaking)