Paul Fletcher v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist
915 F.3d 360
5th Cir.2019Background
- Ninth-grade student I.F. alleged she was sexually assaulted at a private, non-school party by two classmates and thereafter subjected to widescale in-person bullying and social-media harassment at Hebron High (LISD).
- I.F.’s mother reported bullying to the school counselor on Oct. 10, 2012; the school first learned of the alleged sexual assault on Oct. 15, 2012, when parents identified assailants and informed school staff and the police (CPD).
- CPD opened a criminal investigation and requested that the school defer its own fact-finding until police cleared it to proceed; school administrators complied and later opened Title IX-related investigations in January 2013 (after CPD authorization, per the parties’ disputed timeline).
- LISD conducted investigations into the alleged sexual assault and multiple cyberbullying incidents, interviewed many students (including I.F. with counsel present) and concluded it lacked sufficient evidence to discipline for sexual assault; it still counseled students and punished one Instagram poster after CPD charged him.
- I.F. enrolled in LISD’s Homebound program and then withdrew; she sued LISD under Title IX claiming deliberate indifference to sex-based harassment and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for LISD on deliberate indifference; I.F. appealed only that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deliberate indifference should typically be decided by a jury | Juries should decide whether a school’s response was “clearly unreasonable”; Title IX derived from civil-rights standards favors jury resolution | Precedent allows courts to decide deliberate indifference on summary judgment when no genuine factual dispute exists | Court: No; courts may decide deliberate indifference as a matter of law in appropriate cases and summary judgment is proper here |
| Whether LISD had actual knowledge of harassment | I.F.: school knew of assault (Oct. 15) and bullying (Oct. 10) and thus had notice requiring prompt Title IX response | LISD: had notice but initially lacked sex-based details re: Oct. 10 report; coordinated with CPD before investigating | Court: LISD had actual knowledge of the various reports on the dates alleged; the notice point does not preclude summary judgment |
| Whether harassment was so severe/pervasive as to deny access to education | I.F.: in-person taunts, humiliation, and online posts caused depression, suicidal ideation, and inability to return to school | LISD: disputes severity/pervasiveness but does not contest sex-basis or control prongs | Court: Genuine dispute exists on severity/pervasiveness — factual question for jury |
| Whether LISD’s response was deliberately indifferent (timeliness and thoroughness) | I.F.: investigation was unreasonably delayed (after CPD clearance) and school culture (football) caused de-prioritization; Dear Colleague Letter required prompt action | LISD: delayed only while police requested a pause and thereafter took reasonable steps (academic accommodations, Homebound enrollment, multiple interviews, parental contacts, counseling, discipline for Instagram account) | Court: No genuine dispute — LISD’s delay and investigatory steps were not ‘‘clearly unreasonable’’; summary judgment for LISD affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (Title IX deliberate-indifference standard; school liability only for responses that are clearly unreasonable)
- Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011) (Title IX student-on-student harassment elements and deliberate-indifference analysis)
- Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2001) (deliberate indifference is a high standard)
- Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (deliberate indifference requires more than negligence)
- Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (inept or negligent responses do not necessarily constitute deliberate indifference)
- Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982 (5th Cir. 2014) (courts should refrain from second-guessing school disciplinary decisions)
- Nevills v. Mart Indep. Sch. Dist., [citation="608 F. App'x 217"] (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (affirming that deliberate-indifference questions can be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment)