Paul Devoe, III v. Lorie Davis, Director
16-70026
5th Cir.Jan 9, 2018Background
- Devoe was convicted in Texas state court of capital murder for killing Haylie Faulkner and Danielle Hensley and sentenced to death; state courts denied direct appeal and state habeas relief.
- He filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising 15 claims, including challenges to testimony by state expert A.P. Merillat and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims concerning Merillat, Dr. Richard Coons, and mitigation investigation.
- The district court denied habeas relief on all claims, denied funding for an expert under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), and refused certificates of appealability (COA); Devoe sought COAs and appealed the funding denial to the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed COA requests under AEDPA standards (COA requires that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court) and reviewed the funding denial for abuse of discretion.
- The panel concluded Merillat’s testimony was not shown to be false or materially prejudicial given extensive independent evidence of future dangerousness, rejected related Napue/Giglio and Brady theories, denied IAC claims (Strickland standard), and affirmed denial of § 3599(f) funding as not reasonably necessary or would be cumulative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady claim re: Merillat's testimony | Merillat allegedly misstated prison-violence facts and omitted exculpatory details; suppression was material to future-dangerousness | State produced affidavit rebutting falsity; substantial other evidence of future dangerousness | COA denied; claim unexhausted and not materially prejudicial |
| Napue/Giglio (false/impeaching testimony) | Merillat falsely denied regularly testifying in capital cases; state knew and failed to correct | Merillat's affidavit says not required to testify; state did not knowingly present false testimony | COA denied; petitioner failed to show falsity, knowledge, or materiality |
| IAC re: preparation for Merillat | Trial counsel failed to investigate Merillat and relied inadequately on rebuttal expert | Counsel retained experienced rebuttal expert and had strategic reasons; failure to object was not objectively unreasonable | COA denied; no deficient performance or prejudice shown |
| IAC re: Dr. Coons testimony | Counsel should have objected to Coons on admissibility/reliability of future-dangerousness testimony | Counsel reasonably declined challenge for strategic reasons; Coble decision inapposite absent record-specific showing | COA denied; no deficient performance or prejudice |
| IAC re: mitigation investigation | Counsel inadequately investigated/failed to present mitigating evidence (Wiggins claim) | Counsel conducted thorough mitigation investigation and retained mitigation experts; alleged additional evidence largely cumulative | COA denied; no Strickland deficiency or reasonable probability of different result |
| Funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) | Funding needed for expert to develop claims attacking Merillat's testimony | State habeas record already considered merits; Pinholster limits new factual development; expert would be cumulative | Funding denial affirmed for abuse-of-discretion: not "reasonably necessary" and would be cumulative |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (COA standard; jurists of reason inquiry)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (procedural-default COA standard)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution disclosure obligations)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (false testimony/Giglio framework)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (impeachment by evidence of deals/false testimony)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (IAC two-prong test)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference to counsel performance; prejudice standard)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (mitigation-investigation duties)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits on new evidence in § 2254 review)
- Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (Brady materiality/"reasonable probability")
