Paul A. Howell v. Secretary, Florida Department of COrrections, 730 F.3d 1257

Background

Paul Howell was convicted in Florida of first-degree murder and related bomb charges for sending a bomb that killed Trooper James Fulford; state courts affirmed and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1998.
Howell’s federal habeas deadline was one year after finality, but his state postconviction counsel (Jorden) filed a state motion after that federal deadline had passed; Howell later filed a federal §2254 petition that was dismissed as untimely; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (Howell v. Crosby).
The Supreme Court decided Holland v. Florida (2010), holding that extraordinary attorney misconduct (beyond simple negligence) can justify equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
On the eve of his 2013 execution, Howell moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to reopen his final judgment, arguing Holland rendered his prior untimeliness excusable via equitable tolling; the district court denied relief as Holland’s change in law was not an "extraordinary circumstance."
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying Gonzalez v. Crosby to hold that an intervening change in the Court’s interpretation of AEDPA’s limitations/tolling provisions (including Holland) is generally not an extraordinary circumstance warranting Rule 60(b) relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Holland’s change in law is an "extraordinary circumstance" under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a final dismissal for untimely habeas petition	Holland expanded equitable tolling to permit relief for serious attorney misconduct; that change made Howell’s original petition timely and justifies reopening	Gonzalez precludes reopening based on a mere change in decisional law about AEDPA tolling; Holland is the sort of interpretive change that is not extraordinary	Court held Holland’s change in law is not an extraordinary circumstance; affirmed denial of Rule 60(b) relief
Whether Gonzalez’s reasoning is distinguishable because of petitioner’s diligence	Howell argued Gonzalez emphasized petitioner’s lack of diligence, so it should not control	Court read Gonzalez as rejecting the category-of-change rationale, not dependent on petitioner-specific delay	Court held Gonzalez governs and district court did not abuse discretion
(Concurring) Whether attorney incompetence/systemic underfunding should prevent forfeiture of habeas review for death-row inmates	Howell (and concurring judge) argue severe attorney failures and systemic underresourcing make result unjust	State/process arguments not sufficient to overcome Rule 60(b) standards and precedent	Concurrence agreed result should stand under precedent but criticized the fairness of denying relief where counsel was incompetent
Whether Howell’s underlying habeas claims would succeed on the merits (joined concurrence)	Howell contended ineffective assistance, Apprendi/Ring, and conflict claims would warrant relief if considered on merits	Court/concurring judge argued claims fail under Strickland, nonretroactivity of Apprendi/Ring, and waiver/no actual conflict	Concurrence concluded even if reopened, Howell’s habeas claims would not entitle him to relief

Key Cases Cited

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling may apply for certain attorney misconduct beyond simple negligence)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) relief requires extraordinary circumstances; change in AEDPA tolling interpretation is generally not extraordinary)
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (state postconviction application is "properly filed" for tolling despite procedural defaults)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (tolling rules and finality issues under AEDPA interpreted for filing and exhaustion)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (sentencing factfinding and jury right principles)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (death-penalty sentencing factfinding must be by jury)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (new procedural rules like Ring are not retroactive on collateral review)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (presumed prejudice only where counsel actively represented conflicting interests)