Pattullo-Banks v. City of Park Ridge
19 N.E.3d 45
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- Lorraine Pattullo-Banks alleged Park Ridge plowed snow from the street onto a sidewalk near a train station, creating an unnatural accumulation that made the sidewalk impassable.
- Because the sidewalk was blocked, Pattullo-Banks crossed Touhy Avenue at that point (allegedly not within a marked crosswalk) and was struck by a car.
- Plaintiffs sued the City for negligence, alleging the City breached its duty to maintain the sidewalk for intended and permitted users; City raised immunity under 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, reasoning Pattullo-Banks was not an intended or permitted user of the street where she was injured.
- On appeal the court addressed whether section 3-102(a)’s “intended and permitted user” inquiry is tied to the location of the alleged breach (sidewalk) or the location of the injury (street).
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding the user-status inquiry must be tied to the property where the alleged breach occurred (the sidewalk), not where the injury occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 3-102(a) user-status is determined by where the breach occurred or where the injury occurred | User-status should be assessed with respect to the sidewalk (breach location) because plaintiffs allege negligent maintenance of the sidewalk | User-status should be assessed by the street (injury location); because plaintiff was not an intended user of the street, City is immune | Determined by the property where the alleged breach occurred; here the sidewalk controls, so City’s street-user argument was irrelevant |
| Whether the City owed a duty to Pattullo-Banks for sidewalk maintenance | City had duty to maintain sidewalks and not create/leave unnatural accumulations of snow/ice | City argued no duty because injury occurred in the street outside a crosswalk | Existence of duty to maintain sidewalk is recognized; whether City breached that duty is a factual question for trial |
| Whether section 3-102(a) grants immunity when injury results from an activity on otherwise safe property | Plaintiffs: immunity does not apply because injuries arose from unsafe activity caused by sidewalk blockage, not from a street condition | City: immunity applies because injured party was not an intended user of the street where injury occurred | Section 3-102(a) immunity does not apply where injuries arose from an unsafe activity conducted on otherwise safe property; here alleged unsafe activity (being forced into street) arose from sidewalk condition |
| Whether proximate cause / traffic-law violation defeats recovery as a matter of law | Crossing outside a crosswalk is a proximate-cause question for the jury, not an automatic bar | City claimed violation of crossing law and argued it breaks causation | Proximate cause and any contributory negligence are factual issues for the jury; summary judgment inappropriate on those grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417 (1992) (city immune where alleged negligent maintenance was of the street and injured party was not an intended user of the street)
- Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155 (1995) (section 3-102(a) immunity where plaintiff was not an intended user of the street defect that caused injury)
- Boub v. Township of Wayne, 183 Ill. 2d 520 (1998) (immunity under section 3-102(a) where injured party was not an intended user of the bridge that caused injury)
- Kiel v. City of Girard, 274 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1995) (recognizes duty to remove unnatural accumulations of ice and snow from sidewalks; liability may attach where removal creates a new hazard)
- Thorsen v. City of Chicago, 74 Ill. App. 3d 98 (1979) (city has duty to provide safe pedestrian passage; forced entry into the street due to inadequate sidewalks can render proximate-cause question for jury)
- Scerba v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 435 (1996) (reversed summary judgment where a blocked crosswalk forced a child into the street and a jury could find an unbroken causal link)
- Nelson v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 364 Ill. App. 3d 181 (2006) (section 3-102(a) applies when injury arises from a property condition; immunity does not extend to injuries arising from unsafe activities on otherwise safe property)