Patterson v. State
299 Ga. 491
| Ga. | 2016Background
- Ricky Patterson drove his van toward Nathaniel Silvers during a domestic dispute, pinning Silvers against a mobile home and causing serious injury.
- Patterson was indicted and convicted for aggravated assault under former OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2) (aggravated assault by use of an object), which requires a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) (act placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury).
- Patterson sought jury instructions on lesser included offenses—reckless conduct (OCGA § 16-5-60(b)) and reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-390(a))—arguing the charged offense required only general intent to do the act, so lesser mens rea offenses should have been submitted.
- The Court of Appeals held that simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) does not require specific intent to cause apprehension or injury, only intent to do the act; it therefore refused the lesser-included instructions.
- The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) requires specific intent to cause apprehension/injury, and (2) whether refusal to charge reckless-conduct/reckless-driving as lesser included offenses was error.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) requires intent to commit the act that produces apprehension, not a specific intent to cause apprehension or injury; because of that holding, it did not reach the second question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Patterson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) requires specific intent to cause the victim to apprehend injury or suffer injury | Patterson: statute should be read to require specific intent (to injure or to cause apprehension); otherwise ordinary or negligent acts could produce felony liability | State: statute requires only intent to do the act that places victim in reasonable apprehension; no separate specific-intent element exists | Held: No specific intent element; only intent to commit the act that places victim in reasonable apprehension is required (affirmed Court of Appeals) |
| Whether trial court erred by refusing to instruct on reckless conduct and reckless driving as lesser included offenses of aggravated assault | Patterson: reckless offenses involve lesser mens rea and should have been submitted if specific intent was not established | State: because assault requires only intent to do the act, the mens rea overlaps and lesser reckless offenses are not included | Held: Court did not reach this question because resolution of intent issue disposed of the grant; Court of Appeals had held no error and Supreme Court affirmed (no further ruling) |
Key Cases Cited
- Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574 (2010) (aggravated assault requires a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 and an aggravator)
- Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368 (1987) (discusses differentiation between pointing a firearm and aggravated assault where victim is placed in reasonable apprehension)
- Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590 (1998) (held that § 16-5-20(a)(2) looks to victim’s apprehension and requires only intent to do the act, cited by Court of Appeals and earlier Georgia precedents)
- Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608 (2000) (reiterates that only intent to commit the act causing apprehension is required)
- Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 490 (2006) (states that assailant need only intend the act placing another in apprehension, not a specific intent to cause apprehension)