304 Ga. 140
Ga.2018Background
- Katie Patten gave birth in 2015 after her husband Robert Shaughnessy died; maternal grandmother Mary Jo Ardis later sought court-ordered visitation with the child.
- Ardis filed under OCGA § 19-7-3(d) (Grandparent Visitation Rights Act of 2012), which permits a court to award visitation to a parent of a deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent if visitation is in the child’s best interests—even over objection of a fit parent.
- Patten moved to dismiss, arguing § 19-7-3(d) is unconstitutional under Georgia’s Constitution because it allows state interference with parental rights without a clear-and-convincing showing of harm to the child.
- The trial court denied the motion, upheld the statute’s constitutionality, and granted visitation to Ardis solely under subsection (d).
- The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed: it held § 19-7-3(d) violates the state Constitution by permitting visitation over a fit parent’s objection without a showing (by clear and convincing evidence) of actual or threatened harm, and remanded for consideration of § 19-7-3(c).
Issues and Key Cases Cited
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Patten) | Defendant's Argument (Ardis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 19-7-3(d) authorizing grandparent visitation over a fit parent’s objection is constitutional under the Georgia Constitution | § 19-7-3(d) infringes parental right to care, custody, and control because it allows interference absent clear-and-convincing proof of harm to the child | The statute is constitutional; in circumstances of a parent’s death/incapacity/incarceration, courts may award visitation based on best interests without a harm showing | Held unconstitutional: § 19-7-3(d) violates parental rights because it permits visitation over objection of a fit parent without proof (clear and convincing) of actual or threatened harm |
| Remedy and next steps | N/A (seeks dismissal of § 19-7-3(d)-based petition and reversal of visitation order) | Trial court relied solely on § 19-7-3(d) to grant visitation | Judgment granting visitation under § 19-7-3(d) reversed; case remanded for trial court to consider relief under § 19-7-3(c) (which requires clear-and-convincing harm showing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189 (1995) (held prior grandparent-visitation statute unconstitutional where it allowed visitation over fit parents’ objections without showing of harm)
- Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479 (1886) (parent’s custody right is paramount; interference requires clear and strong proof of unfitness or grave cause)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognizes parental right to make child-rearing decisions as a fundamental liberty interest)
- Nix v. Dept. of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794 (1977) (describes parental right to offspring as fundamental and fiercely guarded)
- In re L. H. R., 253 Ga. 439 (1984) (discusses parental right to care, custody, and control)
- Sloan v. Jones, 130 Ga. 836 (1908) (early recognition of parental paramountcy in custody)
- Moore v. Dozier, 128 Ga. 90 (1907) (parental rights may be overcome only by grave and substantial cause)
- Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001) (applies Brooks; discusses state constitutional protection for parental rights)
- In re Suggs, 249 Ga. 365 (1981) (requires clear-and-convincing evidence where state interferes with parental custody)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizes parents’ primary role in upbringing as a deep-rooted tradition)
