Patriotic Veterans, Incorporat v. State of Indiana, 845 F.3d 303

Plaintiff (a veterans’ group) challenged Indiana Code §24-5-14-5, which bans automated recorded calls (robocalls) unless the recipient consented or a live operator obtains consent before playback.
The statute contains three exceptions: school-related messages; messages to persons with a current business or personal relationship with the caller; and messages advising employees of work schedules.
Plaintiff argued Reed v. Gilbert rendered prior circuit precedent obsolete and that Indiana’s law is unconstitutional content discrimination because it disfavors political speech and lacks a political-speech exception.
The district court upheld the statute; this appeal raises only the First Amendment challenge (previously the court addressed preemption and the appellate court reversed that holding).
The Seventh Circuit found the statute’s consent requirement and relationship-based exceptions regulate who may be called (consent/relationship), not the content of messages, except possibly the employee-schedule exception, which plaintiff disavowed as a cited injury.
The court concluded Indiana’s interest in protecting privacy and preventing unwanted automated calls is legitimate and the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that remains valid post-Reed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Indiana’s robocall ban is content-based under Reed	The statute disfavors political speech and lacks a political-speech exception, so it is content-based	The law regulates consent/who may be called (not message content); exceptions are relationship-based, not message-based	Not content-based; statute valid
Whether the statute’s exceptions (schools, relationships, employee schedules) create content discrimination	Exceptions effectively allow message-based distinctions that burden political speech	Exceptions hinge on caller-recipient relationship (implied consent), not content	Exceptions are relationship-based; do not render statute content-discriminatory
Whether the employee-schedule exception harms plaintiff’s ability to communicate	Plaintiff suggested it could limit employee-targeted political messages	Plaintiff conceded it did not feel inhibited communicating with its own employees (who could consent)	Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge subsection (a)(3) as to subsection (b) relief; no cognizable injury from (a)(3) here
Whether the statute is an overbroad restriction requiring a political-speech exemption	Plaintiff urged the state must exempt political speech under the First Amendment	Indiana need not create a message-based exemption; many alternative channels exist and consent is a valid condition	Statute is a valid time, place, manner restriction; Reed does not invalidate it

Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014) (upheld TCPA restrictions on automated calls)
Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995) (upheld state limits on robocalls and sustained TCPA-like restrictions)
Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996) (upheld California anti-robocall statute)
Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (addressed FCC rules and restrictions on automated calls)
Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) (held South Carolina’s robocall statute content-based and unconstitutional)
Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (standards for identifying content-based restrictions under the First Amendment)
Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upheld recipient-based control over mail as a privacy-protective restriction)
Mainstream Marketing Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (upheld do-not-call registry and related restrictions)
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (upheld limits on unsolicited fax transmissions)

Affirmed.