Patrick Hawkins v. State of Florida, 195 So. 3d 1196

Appellant Patrick Hawkins filed a pro se postconviction motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) challenging his habitual felony offender enhancement.
Hawkins was habitualized on a sexual battery conviction (sexual battery with physical force likely to cause serious personal injury), a life felony under the 1995 statute, for an offense committed October 16, 1996.
The 1995 statutory amendment allowing habitualization of life felonies was later declared unconstitutional in State v. Thompson; defendants whose offenses occurred during the Thompson window (Oct. 1, 1995–May 24, 1997) are entitled to resentencing under pre-amendment law.
The trial court denied Hawkins’s 3.800(a) motion, concluding Thompson did not apply; the State argued the claim was untimely and belonged in a 3.850 motion.
The First DCA ordered briefing (Toler order) and considered authority holding such Thompson-window claims may properly be raised under rule 3.800(a).
The court reversed and remanded for resentencing on the sexual battery count under the laws in effect when the offense was committed, and directed use of the 1994 guidelines (Heggs window); upward departure remains discretionary if supported.

Issue	Hawkins’ Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether Thompson prohibits habitualization of Hawkins’ life-felony sexual battery sentence	Thompson applies because offense date (Oct. 16, 1996) falls within Thompson window; habitualization under the 1995 amendment is invalid	The claim is untimely for 3.800(a) and should be raised under rule 3.850	Court: Thompson applies; habitualization invalid for convictions in the window; remand for resentencing
Proper procedural vehicle: 3.800(a) vs 3.850	Claim may be raised under rule 3.800(a)	Claim belongs in rule 3.850 (untimely under 3.800(a))	Court follows weight of authority that such claims are cognizable under 3.800(a)
Sentencing regime on remand (which guidelines/control)	Hawkins entitled to sentencing under pre-amendment law and Heggs window guidelines	State did not dispute need to follow applicable case law	Court: Resentence under laws in effect at offense and 1994 guidelines (Heggs); court may impose upward departure if permissible reasons exist

State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999) (struck 1995 amendment permitting habitualization of life felonies)
James v. State, 775 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (defendants in Thompson window entitled to resentencing under prior law)
Salters v. State, 758 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2000) (defines Thompson window period)
Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000) (guidelines invalidity window requiring application of prior guidelines)
Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000) (application of pre-Heggs guidelines on resentencing)
Simmons v. State, 180 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (3.800(a) is proper vehicle for Thompson-window claims)
Wheeler v. State, 129 So. 3d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (same)
Ford v. State, 868 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (same)
Cook v. State, 866 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (same)
Bines v. State, 837 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (same)
Green v. State, 810 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (same)
Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (same)
Lowe v. State, 786 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (same)
Lewis v. State, 764 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (same)
Hankerson v. State, 765 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (same)
Toler v. State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (procedural order authority)