Trapp v. StateTrapp v. State
We have for review Trapp v. State, 736 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), in which the First District Court of Appeal affirmed Xzavier Trapp‘s conviction and sentence and certified the following question to be one of great public importance:
WHETHER CHAPTER 95-184 VIOLATES ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.
We have jurisdiction. See
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN THIS CASE
On November 8, 1991, the State filed an information charging Trapp with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, with such offense occurring on Octobеr 23, 1991. Trapp later pled nolo contendere to aggravated battery without a firearm, and the trial court adjudicated him guilty of that offense and placed him on three years’ probation. Trapp violated his probation on several later occasions. Subsequently, on February 18, 1997, the State filed an information charging Trapp with attempted first-degree premeditated murder with a firearm, with such offense occurring on January 10, 1997. Trapp pled not guilty and proceeded tо trial, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty as charged. The trial court then adjudicated Trapp guilty on the attempted murder charge and revoked his probation on the 1991 aggravated battery charge.
As for sentencing, the trial court sentenced Trapp to four and one-half years in prison on the aggravated battery charge, to run concurrent with a 155.75-month prison sentence (12.9 years) on the attempted murder charge. Further, because Trapp committed the attempted
In sentencing Trapp on the attempted murder offense, the trial court utilized the sentencing guidelines as amended in chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, and chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida.2 According to the guidelines scoresheet utilized in Trapp‘s case, the following points were assessed in calculating the appropriate sentеnce: 92 points on the attempted murder primary offense; 40 points for severe victim injury; 14 points for the prior aggravated battery offense; 2.6 points for prior misdemeanor offenses; and 4 points for a legal status violation.3 The total sentence points in Trapp‘s case, therefore, was 152.6 points, resulting in a sentencing range of 93.45 months to 155.75 months. The trial court sentenced Trapp to the maximum under the guidelines. If the 1994 guidelines had been used to calculate the sentence in Traрp‘s case, however, 91 points, not 92 points, would have been assessed for the primary offense, and 5.6 points, not 14 points, would have been assessed on the prior aggravated battery offense. See
On appeal, Trapp raised two issues for the First District‘s consideration. See Trapp, 736 So.2d at 737. First, Trapp argued that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to present demonstrative evidencе in the form of a diagram to facilitate witness testimony. See id. The First District found no error regarding this issue and affirmed without further comment. See id. Second, Trapp raised a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-184.4 See id. After analyzing this issue, the First District determined that chaрter 95-184 does not violate the single subject rule and certified to this
II. WINDOW PERIOD ANALYSIS
In Heggs, we noted the conflict between the Second District‘s decision in Heggs v. State, 718 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and the Fourth District‘s decision in Bortel v. State, 743 So.2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), as to when the window period closed for persons claiming a guidelines sentence to be invalid due to the amendments made by chapter 95-184. See 759 So.2d at 623. In its decision in Heggs, the Second District determined that the window period closed on May 24, 1997, when chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida, reenactеd the provisions contained in chapter 95-184 as part of the Legislature‘s biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes. See Heggs, 718 So.2d at 264 n. 1. Conversely, the Fourth District in Bortel determined that the window period closed on October 1, 1996, when the relevant provisions of chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, bеcame effective. See 743 So.2d at 596 (relying on Salters v. State, 731 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State, 721 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We declined to resolve the conflict regarding the window period in our decision in Heggs, however, because the defendant there had standing to raise a single subject rule challenge whether the window period closed on October 1, 1996, or on May 24, 1997. See 759 So.2d at 623. In this case, however, because Trapp committed the underlying offense on January 10, 1997, he would not have standing to raise a single subject rule challenge if the window period closed on October 1, 1996. Therefore, we must determine the window period issue here.
In Salters v. State, 758 So.2d 667 (Fla. 2000), we explained that the general mechanism for curing single subject rule violative chapter laws is through the Legislature‘s biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes. See Salters, at 670 (citing Loxahatchee River Environmental Control District v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 515 So.2d 217 (Fla.1987)). We also explained in Salters that there is an exception to the general rule based on this Court‘s decision in Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167 (Fla.1991). Specifically, in Martinez, this Court determined that the Legislature‘s separation and reenactment of the dissimilar provisions originally cоntained in a chapter law can cure a single subject rule violation. See 582 So.2d at 1172 (determining that separation and reenactment “clearly cured the single subject objection and demonstrated the legislature‘s intent to amend the preexisting workers’ compensation act without the appendage of the international trade legislation“). After considering the general rule and the exception, we determined in Salters that the general rule applied there because the relеvant provisions passed by the Legislature in chapter 96-388 amended, but did not reenact, the relevant provisions contained in chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida. After carefully considering the relevant provisions of chapter 95-184 and chapter 96-388 at issue here, we reach the same conclusion as we did in Salters.
In sections 22, 50, 51, and 53 of chapter 96-388, the Legislature addressed several statutory provisions previously addressed
In section 51 of chapter 96-388, the Legislature amended section 921.0012, Florida Statutes, by making various changes to sentencing guidelines offense levels and the offense ranking chart. See Ch. 96-388, § 51, at 2340-52. Previously, in section 5 of chapter 95-184, the Legislature had amended section 921.0012 by revising sentencing guidelines offense levels and the offense ranking chart. See Ch. 95-184, § 5, at 1679-93.
Finally, in sections 22 and 53 of chapter 96-388, the Legislature amended sеction 921.0014, Florida Statutes, by, among other things, (1) delegating to the Department of Corrections various duties concerning sentencing guidelines scoresheets;6 and (2) revising sentencing guidelines scoresheet computations to reflect changes made in the offense severity ranking chart and to add the “criminal street gang member” multiplier for sentence computations. See Ch. 96-388, § 22 at 2321; § 53 at 2352-56. Previously, in section 6 chapter 95-184, the Legislature had revised sentencing guidelines scoresheet computations by, among other things, increasing points scored on different sentencing criteria. See Ch. 95-184, § 6, at 1693-98.
After considering the relevant provisions of chapter 95-184 and chapter 96-388 in light of the general rule and exception discussed in Salters, we hold that window period for chаllenging the sentencing guidelines provisions amended in chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, opened on October 1, 1995, when such amended guidelines provisions became effective, and closed on May 24, 1997, when chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida, reenaсted the amendments contained in chapter 95-184 as part of the biennial adoption process. Stated another way, persons such as Trapp who are challenging a sentence imposed under the sentencing guidelines as amеnded by chapter 95-184 have standing to do so if the relevant criminal offense or offenses occurred on or after October 1, 1995, and before May 24, 1997. This is so because the Legislature‘s passage of the relevant provisions of chaptеr 96-388 only amended, but did not reenact, the guidelines provisions previously amended in chapter 95-184. Unlike the situation in Scanlan, the Legislature here did not cure the single subject problems implicated in chapter 95-184 by separating the dissimilar provisions and reenacting those provisions into law separately. Based on this analysis and determination, we need not address Trapp‘s argument that chapter 96-388 itself violates the single subject rule.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and find that Trapp has standing to challenge chapter 95-184 on single subject rule grounds. We quash the decision below with directions that Trapp‘s sentence on the attempted murder offense be reversed. Finally, we remand for rеsentencing in accordance with the sentencing guidelines in effect before the relevant amendments made in chapter 95-184 became effective.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, J., dissents.