954 F.3d 1238
9th Cir.2020Background
- Peters, a U.K. citizen, entered the U.S. on B-1 in 2001 and later obtained H-1B status through her employer; her H-1B was extended through July 15, 2006.
- In June 2006 counsel (Richmond) filed an I-129 extension that USCIS rejected for missing supplemental forms; USCIS notified Peters months later after her status had expired.
- Richmond told Peters he promptly refiled a corrected I-129, but produced no documentary proof; USCIS says it never received any corrected filing.
- Peters filed an I-140 in October 2006 and applied to adjust status in June 2007; USCIS denied adjustment because she had been out of lawful status for over 180 days when she filed.
- The IJ and BIA relied on 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(d)(2) to hold Peters ineligible because that regulation narrowly defines “through no fault of his own” and excludes ordinary attorney error; Peters appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit held the regulation invalid to the extent it excludes reasonable reliance on counsel and remanded, finding Peters’ failure to maintain status could be excused as “through no fault of her own.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Peters’ loss of status was "through no fault of her own" when it resulted from counsel's error | Peters: reasonable reliance on counsel’s assurances excused her failure to maintain status | Government: applicant bears responsibility; regulation properly limits "no fault" to narrow, enumerated circumstances | Court: reasonable reliance on counsel can constitute "no fault"; Peters’ reliance was reasonable and she remains eligible |
| Whether 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(d)(2)(i) validly excludes ordinary attorney error from the statutory "no fault" exception | Peters: regulation is impermissibly narrow and conflicts with statute | Government: regulation is a permissible agency interpretation | Court: regulation is invalid to the extent it excludes reasonable reliance on counsel (Chevron framework) |
| Whether the IJ properly applied the regulation and denied relief based on its definition | Peters: IJ erred by applying an overly narrow regulatory definition and by refusing to adjudicate the legal challenge appropriately | Government: IJ/BIA correctly applied the regulatory definition and factual findings | Court: IJ erred in denying adjustment under §1255(c)(2); remanded to BIA to consider alternative grounds in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Ma v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2018) (discusses §1255(k) 180‑day rule for skilled workers)
- Pleitez‑Lopez v. Barr, 935 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2019) (reliance on counsel can excuse certain immigration defaults)
- Monjaraz‑Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasonable reliance on attorney advice can constitute an "exceptional circumstance")
- Espinoza‑Gutierrez v. Smith, 94 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1996) (limits on IJ jurisdiction to decide certain legal challenges)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for reviewing agency interpretations)