Patricia Mae Voter v. Dexter R. Voter
109 A.3d 626
| Me. | 2015Background
- Patricia and Dexter Voter divorced in 2006 after a 27-year marriage; the judgment required Dexter to pay Patricia $1,300/month general spousal support until he retired, after which support would be “1/2 of his retirement earnings.”
- Patricia has not remarried and remains entitled to support; she is elderly, lives in subsidized housing, and has limited income (Social Security under $9,000/year absent spousal support).
- Dexter stopped working in April 2013 due to disability and began receiving USPS and USAF retirement benefits, Social Security Disability (SSD), rental income, and expected future Social Security retirement benefits.
- In May 2013 Dexter moved to modify spousal support; the parties agreed the court would first clarify the term “retirement earnings.”
- The District Court defined “retirement earnings” broadly as “all monies paid to or received by” Dexter after retirement (including Social Security, SSD, postal and military retirement, rental income, and any monies for labor), then denied Dexter’s motion to modify after a hearing.
- Court found Patricia’s need remained high and Dexter’s post-retirement income (about $51,000/year) and spending habits indicated he could afford the support; judgment denying modification was entered and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Voter (Plaintiff/Appellee) Argument | Dexter (Defendant/Appellant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly clarified the ambiguous term “retirement earnings” in the divorce judgment | Court’s broad construction is consistent with the judgment’s purpose to provide ongoing general support | "Retirement earnings" should be limited (exclude Social Security or only include pension/plan-derived benefits or income actually earned after retirement) | Clarification was proper: term was ambiguous and court permissibly defined it to include all monies received after retirement, including SSD, Social Security, pensions, rental income, and labor income |
| Whether the clarification materially altered the original judgment | Clarification merely made the language precise and aligns with original intent | Clarification improperly expanded the scope and materially changed obligation | Not a material alteration; court stayed within authority to clarify judgment |
| Whether Dexter demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of support | Retirement reduces income; thus support should be terminated or reduced | Retirement was anticipated and the judgment ties post-retirement support to a percentage of retirement earnings; Dexter can still afford payments | Denial of modification affirmed: court did not abuse discretion — change was anticipated, Dexter could afford payments, and Patricia’s need persisted |
| Whether Patricia’s later cohabitation was a functional equivalent of marriage warranting termination under 19-A M.R.S. § 951‑A(12) | Cohabitation did not constitute the functional equivalent of marriage; she lived with a friend to "get by" | Patricia’s relationship and shared residence made support terminable | Court’s finding that the relationship was not the functional equivalent of marriage was not clearly erroneous; termination not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. Rothman, 791 A.2d 921 (Me. 2002) (sets two-step test for ambiguity and deference to clarification by the issuing court)
- Burnell v. Burnell, 40 A.3d 390 (Me. 2012) (ambiguity assessed de novo)
- MacDonald v. MacDonald, 582 A.2d 976 (Me. 1990) (court’s inherent authority to clarify its judgments)
- Ezell v. Lawless, 955 A.2d 202 (Me. 2008) (assumption of necessary findings when no request made)
- Miele v. Miele, 832 A.2d 760 (Me. 2003) (purpose of general spousal support to provide future maintenance)
- Sorey v. Sorey, 718 A.2d 568 (Me. 1998) (equitable considerations in spousal support and relevance of payor’s household resources)
- McAllister v. McAllister, 21 A.3d 1010 (Me. 2011) (standard of review and substantial change requirement for modification)
- Day v. Day, 717 A.2d 914 (Me. 1998) (modification overturned only for plain and unmistakable injustice)
- Klopp v. Klopp, 598 A.2d 462 (Me. 1991) (baseline includes foreseeable future circumstances reflected in original award)
- Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750 (Me. 1983) (construction of judgments rests with the court’s intent)
- Corcoran v. Marie, 12 A.3d 71 (Me. 2011) (clarification does not equal modification when making language precise)