Patricia Flores v. Attorney General United States
856 F.3d 280
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Patricia Flores, a Guatemalan national, pleaded guilty in South Carolina to accessory after the fact for failing to report a murder and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment; she later was removed and then reentered the U.S.
- After a later arrest, Flores applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection, asserting fear of harm in Guatemala (family violence, gang rape, persecution for sexual orientation).
- The Immigration Judge found Flores ineligible for withholding because her accessory-after-the-fact conviction was a "particularly serious crime" (tied to an aggravated felony under the INA) and denied CAT relief; the BIA affirmed both rulings.
- The BIA and government treated the conviction as "relating to obstruction of justice," invoking the INA aggravated-felony provision listing offenses "relating to obstruction of justice."
- The Third Circuit reviewed de novo whether Flores’s conviction is an aggravated felony/"particularly serious crime" under Denis v. Attorney General and reviewed exhaustion/jurisdiction over the CAT claim.
- The Third Circuit held Flores’s South Carolina accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not "related to obstruction of justice," so it is not an aggravated felony or a "particularly serious crime," but it dismissed review of the CAT claim for lack of exhaustion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Flores’s South Carolina accessory-after-the-fact conviction is an aggravated felony or a "particularly serious crime" because it "relates to obstruction of justice" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) | Flores: South Carolina offense targets aiding a principal and lacks the nexus/elemental similarity to Chapter 73 obstruction statutes, so it does not "relate to" obstruction of justice | Government: conviction is sufficiently connected (or comparable to federal accessory statutes) and thus falls within "relating to obstruction of justice" | Held: No. Applying Denis’s categorical "logical or causal connection" test to Chapter 73, the court found no logical or causal connection to §§ 1503 or 1512(c); conviction is not an aggravated felony or "particularly serious crime." |
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review Flores’s CAT claim (exhaustion of administrative remedies) | Flores sought review but did not meaningfully dispute BIA’s finding she failed to present new evidence to the BIA | Government: lack of exhaustion deprives the court of jurisdiction | Held: No jurisdiction. Flores failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s CAT denial before the BIA; petition on CAT relief is dismissed for lack of exhaustion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Denis v. Attorney General, 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011) (framework applying a categorical "logical or causal connection" test for offenses "relating to obstruction of justice")
- Bobb v. Attorney General, 458 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2006) (definition of "relate" as showing a logical or causal connection)
- Park v. Attorney General, 472 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 2006) ("relating to" analysis looks beyond a single federal statute; class/subject approach)
- United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (elements and nexus required for § 1503 obstruction convictions)
- United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (nexus requirement for convictions under § 1512 provisions involving official proceedings)
- Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting broad/vague constructions of the Obstruction Provision as unconstitutionally vague)