Parshall v. State, 908 N.W.2d 434

In July 2015 Russell Parshall entered a Rule 43 guilty plea labeled “Driving Under the Influence N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal)”; the plea agreement and criminal judgment explicitly included the parenthetical “(First Offense Refusal).”
Parshall later sought post-conviction relief after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016), which held warrantless blood draws are not permitted as searches incident to arrest and that criminalizing refusal of a warrantless blood test is unconstitutional.
The district court denied relief, finding the factual basis supported a general DUI conviction (impairment) in addition to refusal, and declined to decide Birchfield’s retroactivity beyond stating the refusal statute was constitutionally defective from enactment.
Parshall appealed, arguing Birchfield created a retroactive substantive rule voiding his refusal conviction and entitling him to return of fines/fees under Nelson v. Colorado.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s interpretation of the plea agreement, concluding the plea language unambiguously limited the conviction to the refusal offense, and remanded for further proceedings on retroactivity and restitution issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Parshall)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Was Parshall’s plea to the specific refusal offense or to general DUI?	Plea and judgment language show he pleaded to “First Offense Refusal” only.	The factual basis (impairment facts) supports a general DUI conviction as well as refusal.	Court: Plea unambiguously limited to the refusal offense; district court erred in interpreting plea to general DUI.
2. Does Birchfield apply retroactively to vacate Parshall’s conviction?	Birchfield announces a substantive rule barring criminal liability for refusing warrantless blood tests and should apply retroactively.	State urged factual-basis interpretation; district court avoided full retroactivity ruling.	Court: Declined to decide retroactivity on appeal and remanded for district court to resolve.
3. Is Parshall entitled to return of fines/fees if conviction vacated?	If conviction voided, Nelson requires refund of fines/fees paid.	State noted concurrent convictions and ambiguity which may affect refund entitlement.	Court: Remanded to district court to address refund, did not rule on entitlement.
4. Proper standard for interpreting plea agreements?	Pleas are contracts; plain language controls and extrinsic facts cannot rewrite an unambiguous plea.	State relied on factual basis to interpret plea scope.	Court: Applies contract principles; plain language of plea governs and limited to refusal.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (held warrantless blood draws are not justified as searches incident to arrest and criminalizing refusal of such blood tests is unconstitutional)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (new substantive constitutional rules must be given retroactive effect in state collateral review)
Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (state must return fines and fees taken pursuant to an invalid conviction)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding voiding a statutory sentencing provision can announce a substantive rule requiring retroactivity)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (Teague framework: new rules generally nonretroactive except narrow exceptions)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (established nonretroactivity doctrine and its two exceptions)
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (articulated test for determining whether a rule is "new" for retroactivity purposes)
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood draws except in exigent circumstances)