Parrish v. City of Albuquerque
1:20-cv-01055
| D.N.M. | May 13, 2021Background
- Teresa Parrish, a mobility-impaired passenger, booked an international Delta flight from Albuquerque to Canada and required wheelchair assistance at the airport.
- Delta provided assistance to the gate but lacked sufficient staff at boarding; Parrish was told to board without assistance and attempted to wheel herself down the jet bridge.
- Parrish lost control of her wheelchair on the jet bridge, fell, and sustained injuries; she sued in New Mexico state court asserting state-law claims.
- Defendants removed to federal court asserting the Montreal Convention completely preempts state-law claims and therefore creates federal-question jurisdiction.
- Parrish moved to remand; the district court interpreted Article 29 of the Montreal Convention and concluded the Convention does not completely preempt state-law claims but operates as an affirmative defense.
- The court granted remand, finding defendants failed to carry their burden to establish federal-question jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Montreal Convention completely preempts state-law tort claims so removal under federal-question jurisdiction is proper | Montreal Convention does not completely preempt; it is an affirmative defense; state-law claims remain enforceable | Montreal Convention completely preempts state claims arising on embarkation/disembarkation and thus federal jurisdiction exists | No complete preemption; remand ordered |
| Whether El Al v. Tseng supports complete preemption | Tseng addresses conflict preemption/merits, not complete preemption for removal | Tseng precludes state personal-injury recovery outside Convention terms and thus supports defendants' removal theory | Court distinguishes Tseng as addressing preclusion (defense), not complete preemption for removal |
| Proper reading of Article 29 ("under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise") | The disjunctive language contemplates alternative state-law causes; Convention limits liability but does not supplant state law | Article 29 creates an exclusive federal remedy displacing state-law claims | Court reads Article 29 plainly: alternatives exist; Convention limits apply but do not convert state claims into federal ones |
Key Cases Cited
- El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (held Warsaw Convention precluded certain state personal-injury claims that did not meet its conditions)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (describes "complete preemption" doctrine that converts state claims into federal ones)
- Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule; plaintiff is master of the claim)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (discusses complete preemption as basis for federal jurisdiction)
- Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2013) (complete preemption is rare; Tenth Circuit guidance)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (statutory interpretation principle against rendering words superfluous)
- DeJoseph v. Continental Airlines, 18 F. Supp. 3d 595 (D.N.J. 2014) (reads Convention as limiting liability but not completely preempting state-law claims)
- Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (background on Montreal Convention replacing Warsaw Convention)