2019 Ohio 328
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- February 27, 2012: Thomas Lane III carried a concealed handgun into Chardon High School and shot multiple students in the cafeteria and hallway; six seconds elapsed between first and last shots in the cafeteria and ~22 seconds from first shot to Lane leaving the building. Three students died; others were injured or paralyzed.
- Plaintiffs (families and an injured student) sued Chardon Local Schools, several school employees, Lake Academy-related entities, and others for wrongful death, survivorship, negligence, recklessness, and claims alleging malicious/bad-faith/wanton conduct under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).
- Earlier rulings dismissed claims against the district and some defendants on statutory immunity and other grounds; remaining claims were against individual school employees (superintendent, principal, assistant principals, operations manager, etc.).
- Plaintiffs’ theory: school employees ignored repeated security recommendations (including a proposed school resource officer (SRO)), removed an SRO recommendation from an SSAT report, and thereby acted recklessly/wantonly such that statutory immunity should be lost; expert Gregory Baeppler opined an SRO would have deterred/prevented the shooting.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity, absence of evidence of malice/bad faith/wantonness/recklessness, lack of foreseeability of Lane’s acts, and that decisions about SROs rested with the Board (not individual employees); the trial court granted summary judgment for the school employees and the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Plaintiffs’ security expert (Baeppler) | Baeppler’s report creates triable issues: an SRO would have deterred/prevented the shooting and failure to hire one was reckless/wanton | Report is speculative, opines on ultimate issues and legal duties, lacks reliable basis/standards, and would be inadmissible at trial | Court excluded expert opinions as speculative and legal conclusions; admissibility decision affirmed |
| Whether school employees forfeited R.C. 2744 immunity by acting with malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness | School employees were indifferent to known risks, ignored law-enforcement recommendations (SRO), and their failures were more than negligence | No evidence of malicious or consciously reckless conduct; decisions about SROs were collective/board-level or budget decisions; no knowledge that Lane posed a specific danger | No genuine issue of material fact that conduct rose above negligence; summary judgment for school employees affirmed |
| Foreseeability of the shooting and duty to protect from third-party criminal acts | Increasing school shootings made such attacks foreseeable; prior active shooter drill and nearby gun incident made proactive measures necessary | No history of violent conduct by Lane, no notice he would bring a gun, and prior security measures and law-enforcement cooperation made the shooting unforeseeable to employees | Court held no evidence employees knew or should have known of Lane’s propensity; foreseeability insufficient to defeat immunity |
| Causation—could an SRO have prevented the shooting | An SRO stationed in cafeteria would likely have deterred Lane or stopped the attack within seconds | Whether an SRO would have acted in time is speculative; hiring decisions were Board prerogative; Lane’s actions were the proximate cause | Court found Baeppler’s causation opinion speculative and did not create a material factual dispute; did not reach defendants’ alternative sole-proximate-cause argument on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356 (summary-judgment standard and caution in granting relief)
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (Civ.R.56 standards for summary judgment)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (de novo appellate review of summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden; reciprocal burden on nonmoving party)
- O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (definitions and standards for reckless conduct under R.C. 2744)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (recklessness defined as substantially greater than negligence)
- Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334 (definition of malice)