Parks v. Parks
304 Mich. App. 232
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Parties married in 2004; child born during the marriage. Husband (Parks) later filed for divorce; a consent judgment (2011) awarded joint legal and physical custody.
- In 2013 defendant (the mother) moved under the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA) to declare the child born out of wedlock, set aside the paternity/custody portion of the divorce, and enter an order of filiation naming her current husband, David Achinger, as the father, relying principally on a privately obtained DNA test showing Achinger is the biological father.
- Plaintiff (Parks) opposed, produced an e-mail where he repeatedly asserted “I am [the child’s] father,” and denied ever mutually and openly acknowledging Achinger as the father.
- At a hearing the parties presented arguments but no live testimony or admissible evidence resolving disputed facts; defendant’s counsel relied on alleged statements by Parks to third parties as evidence of acknowledgment.
- Trial court denied defendant’s RPA motion, finding she failed to show the RPA’s required mutual and open acknowledgment and alternatively that setting aside paternity would not be in the child’s best interests. Defendant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an evidentiary hearing is required before denying an RPA motion under MCL 722.1441(1)(a)(ii) | No hearing necessary where movant fails to meet a threshold showing of contested facts; court may exercise discretion | A hearing was required to determine whether there was a mutual and open acknowledgment among the three parties | Trial court did not err; an evidentiary hearing is discretionary and not required absent a threshold showing of contested factual issues |
| Whether defendant met the RPA threshold that the presumed father, alleged father, and mother “mutually and openly acknowledged” the biological relationship | Parks maintains he never acknowledged Achinger as the father and expressly held himself out as the child’s father | Defendant contends Parks made admissions to counsel, relatives, and others that amount to mutual and open acknowledgment | Defendant failed to meet the statutory requirement; alleged statements were hearsay or did not constitute acknowledgment of Achinger as the father |
| Whether, if the RPA threshold were met, setting aside paternity would be in the child’s best interests | Parks argued setting aside would harm the child; trial court considered best-interest factors and denied relief | Defendant argued child should be placed with biological father Achinger | Court declined to reach this issue on appeal because defendant failed to satisfy the RPA threshold; trial court had also found best-interests did not favor relief |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Moiles, 303 Mich App 59 (2013) (standards for reviewing child-related factual findings and statutory interpretation)
- In re Townsend Conservatorship, 293 Mich App 182 (2011) (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
- Tellin v Forsyth Twp, 291 Mich App 692 (2011) (statutory interpretation principles; plain meaning rule)
- Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 472 Mich 192 (2005) (presumption that unambiguous statutory language controls)
- Grimes v Van Hook-Williams, 302 Mich App 521 (2013) (scope and purpose of the Revocation of Paternity Act)
- Augustine v Allstate Ins Co, 292 Mich App 408 (2011) (attorney-client privilege applies to communications with counsel)
- Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599 (2009) (custody-act threshold for evidentiary hearings)
- Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499 (2003) (no hearing required absent threshold showing under custody standards)