377 F. Supp. 3d 241
S.D. Ill.2019Background
- Plaintiff Markeith Parks, a New York resident, sued Rachael Ray Nutrish (Ainsworth Pet Nutrition) alleging dog food labeled "Natural" contained glyphosate and that he paid a premium relying on the "natural" label.
- Alleged causes of action: New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 (deceptive acts / false advertising), breach of express warranty, and unjust enrichment; class action posture asserted.
- Defendant moved to dismiss (or alternatively to stay pending FDA guidance on the term "natural").
- Key contested factual point: complaint alleges trace glyphosate in products but does not specify amounts or whether levels are harmful; supporting exhibits referenced were not attached.
- Court accepted complaint facts for the 12(b)(6) analysis but required more to show that any glyphosate presence was material to reasonable consumers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption under FDCA / NLEA | Parks seeks removal of the "Natural" label for being false/misleading; not seeking mandatory federal disclosure | Federal labeling law (FDCA/NLEA) preempts state claims that impose non-identical labeling requirements; FDA statements limit scope of "natural" | Claims based on § 343(a) false/misleading labeling are not preempted by NLEA's express preemption; FDA comment has no preemptive effect |
| NY GBL §§ 349 & 350 (materiality) | Any presence of glyphosate makes "Natural" false; consumer paid premium relying on label | Trace or negligible glyphosate would not make "Natural" misleading to a reasonable consumer | Dismissed without prejudice: complaint fails to allege amount/harmful level of glyphosate to show a materially misleading representation; leave to amend |
| Breach of express warranty | "Natural" was an affirmation inducing purchase; warranty relied upon | A reasonable consumer would not interpret "Natural" to mean zero trace glyphosate; unspecified trace amounts do not breach warranty | Dismissed without prejudice; leave to replead with facts showing a warranty breach |
| Injunctive relief (standing) | Requests reformulation/removal of label; would consider future purchase if reformulated | Past injury alone insufficient for injunctive relief absent likely future harm | Request for injunctive relief dismissed for lack of alleged realistic future injury/standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (Supremacy Clause and preemption principles)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (presumption against preemption in fields traditionally regulated by states)
- Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (courts should adopt preemption readings that disfavour preemption when plausible)
- New York SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (overview of express, field, and conflict preemption and focus on congressional intent)
- Axon v. Citrus World, Inc., 354 F.Supp.3d 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (distinguishing claims seeking removal of "natural" label from claims seeking glyphosate disclosure)
- Buonasera v. Honest Co., Inc., 208 F.Supp.3d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying dismissal of "natural" labeling claims where products allegedly contained synthetic/toxic ingredients)
- Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (limits on state-court specific jurisdiction; discussed for class/jurisdictional implications)