Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago
872 F.3d 495
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Chicago enacted a “puppy mill” ordinance banning city pet retailers from reselling dogs, cats, or rabbits unless sourced from government-run animal control/care facilities or humane/rescue organizations.
- City Council adopted the ordinance to curb support for commercial mill breeders, reduce consumer harm from unhealthy/behaviorally damaged animals, increase shelter adoptions, and lower municipal sheltering/euthanasia costs.
- Two Chicago pet stores and an out-of-state dog breeder sued, alleging the ordinance exceeded Chicago’s home-rule authority under the Illinois Constitution and violated the dormant Commerce Clause by impairing interstate commerce.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6); plaintiffs appealed. The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo, accepting well-pleaded facts as true.
- The ordinance applies evenhandedly to all large commercial breeders (in-state and out-of-state) by restricting retail sourcing to shelters and rescues; Chicago’s existing pet-shop licensing and care regulations were broader but did not preempt this source restriction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chicago exceeded home-rule authority under the Illinois Constitution | Ordinance intrudes on an area of statewide concern and is preempted by state law | Animal control/welfare is a traditional area of concurrent local/state regulation; no clear state legislative limit on municipal power exists | Held: Chicago may exercise concurrent home-rule power; ordinance valid under Illinois Constitution |
| Whether the ordinance facially discriminates against interstate commerce | Ordinance functions as a de facto ban on out-of-state bred pets, burdening interstate sellers | Ordinance applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders; it targets large breeders regardless of location | Held: No facial discrimination; law is evenhanded |
| Whether the ordinance has discriminatory practical effect (disparate impact) triggering Pike balancing | Plaintiffs allege consumers will buy directly from (possibly out-of-state) breeders or unregulated brokers, disproportionately burdening interstate commerce | Effects are not plausibly shown to disadvantage out-of-state sellers; any competitive shift may benefit nearby in- or out-of-state breeders equally | Held: Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing discriminatory practical effect; Pike balancing not triggered |
| Standard of review under the dormant Commerce Clause and whether ordinance survives | Plaintiffs urge Pike balancing and factual record | City argues rational-basis review applies because law does not reallocate markets among jurisdictions | Held: Ordinance falls into the non-discriminatory category; rational-basis review applies and the ordinance is rationally related to legitimate local interests; Commerce Clause claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (establishes balancing test for nondiscriminatory laws with incidental burdens on interstate commerce)
- Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995) (three-category framework for dormant Commerce Clause analysis)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard: plausibility required to survive Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard and inferences at dismissal stage)
- Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (discusses Pike and nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce)
- United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (addresses Pike in context of nondiscriminatory local regulation)
- City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844 (Ill.) (Kalodimos factors for home-rule scope and concurrent authority analysis)
- County of Cook v. Village of Bridgeview, 8 N.E.3d 1275 (Ill.) (analysis of statewide interest and traditional role in animal control/rabies context)
- New York Pet Welfare Ass’n v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar puppy-mill ordinance challenge)
