Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 5681
2d Cir.2013Background
- Parisi sued Goldman Sachs for gender discrimination under Title VII and NYC Human Rights Law, asserting a pattern and practice of discrimination against female employees.
- Parisi signed a Managing Director Agreement containing a broad arbitration clause covering employment-related matters.
- Goldman Sachs moved to compel arbitration under the FAA, arguing class-wide arbitration was unavailable given Stolt-Nielsen and the clause's silence on class claims.
- The magistrate judge denied enforcement, concluding the clause would preclude a Title VII pattern-or-practice claim in arbitration.
- The district court adopted that ruling, denying arbitration, and this appeal followed.
- The court held there is no substantive Title VII right to pursue a pattern-or-practice class claim; arbitration may proceed for Parisi’s individual Title VII claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is there a substantive Title VII pattern-or-practice right? | Parisi argues pattern-or-practice is a standalone right in Title VII. | Goldman Sachs contends no freestanding pattern-or-practice right exists. | No substantive pattern-or-practice right exists. |
| Does arbitration preclude vindicating a statutory right under Title VII? | Individual arbitration would prevent vindication of a pattern-or-practice method of proof under Title VII. | Arbitration does not forgo statutory rights and can proceed for individual claims. | Arbitration does not bar vindicating Title VII rights; no nonarbitrable statutory right present. |
| Should the district court have enforced the arbitration clause under FAA? | Arbitration should be denied because it would thwart a statutory right. | Arbitration should be compelled consistent with FAA preference for arbitration. | District court erred; arbitration should be compelled. |
| Can parity for pattern-or-practice evidence be admitted in arbitration? | Plaintiff may present discriminatory patterns to arbiters to prove Title VII claims. | Only individual discriminations can be proven; no pattern evidence allowed. | Plaintiff may introduce pattern evidence to support statutory claims in arbitration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (arbitration for class claims requires clear agreement)
- CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (federal policy favoring arbitration persists for statutory claims)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (federal policy favors arbitration; class waivers allowed)
- Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (statutory claims may be arbitrated)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (arbitration policy and contract interpretation in statuto)
- In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (class waiver can render arbitration unworkable for antitrust claims)
- Chin v. Port Authority of New York, 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (pattern-or-practice is not a freestanding right)
- Ragone v. Atl. Video, 595 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010) (Title VII claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration)
- Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (Rule 23 is procedural; does not create substantive rights)