482 F.Supp.3d 365
E.D. Pa.2020Background
- In response to COVID-19, Pennsylvania issued March 19, 2020 orders closing non–life‑sustaining businesses; DCED opened a waiver program to allow some businesses to reopen.
- Over 42,000 waiver requests were filed; nearly 7,000 waivers were granted (including Wolf Home Products); the waiver program ended April 3 before all requests were processed.
- Plaintiffs are three Pennsylvania businesses: Kenwood Pools (retail/service), WIN Home Inspection, and MQRE (realtor). Nearby competitors received waivers while plaintiffs’ waiver requests were denied (MQRE did not apply).
- Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting: (1) substantive due process violations (Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments) for interference with their right to earn a living, and (2) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations (class‑of‑one) based on unequal waiver treatment.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (mootness) and failure to state a claim; the court treated mootness as a factual jurisdictional attack and considered public records about reopening.
- The Court granted dismissal of the substantive due process claim but denied dismissal of the equal protection claim as plausible; subject matter jurisdiction was held plausible at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction / Mootness | Case remains justiciable because the pandemic and risk of future orders make recurrence likely | Reopening renders claims moot; no live controversy | Jurisdiction plausible at this stage; voluntary cessation doctrine and pandemic make mootness not established |
| Substantive due process — right to operate business | Plaintiffs have protectable property/liberty interest in operating their businesses and earning a living | Temporary closures do not implicate substantive due process protections for business operation | Dismissed: right to operate a business is not protected here; temporary restraints do not amount to the permanent deprivation substantive due process protects |
| Equal protection (class‑of‑one) — disparate waivers | Defendants selectively granted waivers to competitors similarly situated without rational basis | Waiver distinctions are rationally related to legitimate public‑health/regulatory concerns | Survives motion: pleadings plausibly allege similarly situated treatment and lack of any rational basis; claim not dismissed |
| Eleventh Amendment / Ex parte Young defense | Plaintiffs seek prospective relief and challenge conduct that may recur; Ex parte Young applies | Defendants argue sovereign immunity bars claims tied to past conduct | Court not persuaded sovereign immunity bars claim at this stage; threat of future enforcement permits Ex parte Young theory |
Key Cases Cited
- Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (federal court must have subject‑matter jurisdiction)
- Wrench Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Bradley, [citation="340 F. App'x 812"] (3d Cir. 2009) (right to engage in business not protected by substantive due process)
- Piecknick v. Commonwealth, 36 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994) (constitutional protection for liberty to pursue a calling, not a specific job)
- Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999) (substantive due process protects against complete prohibitions, not brief interruptions)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class‑of‑one equal protection theory)
- Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (application of the plausibility standard)
- People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (voluntary cessation does not moot a claim if recurrence is reasonably expected)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (mootness and voluntary cessation principles)