975 F.3d 171
2d Cir.2020Background
- Section 431 of the 1930 Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act originally required masters of vessels (expressly excluding aircraft) arriving in the U.S. to keep manifests and specified certain manifest information for public disclosure.
- In 1984 Congress added §431(c)(1), listing specific manifest information that "shall be available for public disclosure."
- In July 1996 the Anti‑Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) amended §431(c)(1) to refer to "vessel or aircraft manifest" and added references to "aircraft" and "airport" in subsections (D)–(F).
- In October 1996 Congress enacted a Corrections Act that directed replacing "such manifest" with "a vessel manifest," producing a drafting conflict/draft error that left the statute's operative text ambiguous.
- ImportGenius and Panjiva sought aircraft manifest data via FOIA; CBP denied. Plaintiffs sued asserting §431(c)(1) requires public disclosure of aircraft manifests. The district court dismissed; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding §431(c)(1) covers only waterborne vessels.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §431(c)(1) requires public disclosure of aircraft manifests | The operative clause and subsections expressly include "aircraft" and "airport," so aircraft manifests are covered | Corrections Act intended to limit disclosure to "vessel" manifests; statutory definition of "vessel" excludes aircraft; text is ambiguous due to drafting error | Affirmed: §431(c)(1) requires disclosure of vessel (watercraft) manifests only |
| Whether courts may consult legislative history and canons to resolve ambiguity | Text is clear; canon against surplusage supports reading to include aircraft | Text is ambiguous; can consult legislative history — Senate Finance Committee report shows Corrections Act intended to restrict scope to vessels; canon against surplusage not dispositive | Court: text ambiguous; legislative history appropriate and supports limiting disclosure to vessels; surplusage canon does not control |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Sequoia Fund, Inc., 938 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 2019) (standard of review on Rule 12(b)(6))
- In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2002) (statutory interpretation begins with text)
- Nwozuzu v. Holder, 726 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2013) (plain meaning inquiry and use of legislative history when ambiguous)
- United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2016) (meaning is plain, inquiry ends)
- Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) (canon against surplusage principle)
- Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013) (surplusage canon not absolute)
- United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (presumption against implied repeal)
- Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2007) (resort to legislative history when statute is ambiguous)
- Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (caution on relying on subsequent legislative history)