PANGAN-SIS
27 I. & N. Dec. 130
| BIA | 2017Background
- Respondent conceded removability for unlawful presence/entry after DHS charged her under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i); IJ terminated proceedings finding exception under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(ii).
- The IJ concluded the respondent could qualify for the § 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) exception based on abuse by her non‑U.S.‑citizen Guatemalan spouse.
- DHS appealed, arguing the statutory exception requires the alien to be a VAWA self‑petitioner and thus the respondent (not a VAWA self‑petitioner) is ineligible.
- Statutory text at issue: § 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) contains three subclauses—(I) alien is a VAWA self‑petitioner; (II) alien or child battered/extremely cruelly treated (including by household members with consent/acquiescence); and (III) a substantial connection between the abuse and the unlawful entry.
- Board found the text ambiguous but, guided by VAWA legislative history and purpose, held all three subclauses (I), (II), and (III) must be satisfied, including VAWA self‑petitioner status.
- Decision: DHS appeal sustained; IJ decision vacated; removal proceedings reinstated and remanded for further proceedings and opportunity to seek other relief (e.g., asylum, withholding, CAT).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an alien seeking the § 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) exception must satisfy all three subclauses, including VAWA self‑petitioner status | Respondent: statutory language is ambiguous; subclause (III) references (I) or (II) so alien need only satisfy (II) and (III) | DHS: exception requires satisfying subclauses (I), (II), and (III); without VAWA self‑petitioner status alien is ineligible | Board: Adopted DHS view — all three subclauses required, including VAWA self‑petitioner status |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (statutory plain‑meaning/interpretation principles)
- K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (interpret statute in context of whole statute)
- Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (statutory interpretation principles cited)
- Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (look to statutory language, context, and design)
- United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225 (construe phrases in light of overall statutory purpose)