Pamela Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564

Background

Pamela Jo Golinveaux pleaded guilty (2008) to being a felon in possession of ammunition and was sentenced under the ACCA as an armed career criminal based on at least three prior qualifying felonies.
The PSR listed six prior convictions that could qualify as violent felonies but did not specify which ACCA clause (residual clause vs. force clause) supported the enhancement; the plea stipulated ACCA status.
After Johnson v. United States invalidated ACCA’s residual clause, Golinveaux filed a § 2255 motion asserting she no longer qualified for ACCA; the Government conceded two prior convictions no longer qualified.
The district court denied relief; on appeal the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the sentencing relied on the residual clause and whether, under the legal environment at sentencing, a listed prior (Iowa second-degree robbery under Iowa Code § 711.1(1)) qualified under the force clause.
The court applied Walker v. United States (Eighth Circuit) holding the movant must prove by a preponderance that the residual clause led the enhancement; where the record is inconclusive, courts may examine the background legal environment at sentencing.
The Eighth Circuit concluded the Iowa robbery conviction qualified under the ACCA force clause under the controlling law at sentencing, so Golinveaux had three valid predicates and any Johnson error was harmless; the denial of § 2255 was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Golinveaux must prove the sentencing court relied on the residual clause to obtain relief under Johnson	Golinveaux contended Johnson eliminated her ACCA status and that the enhancement likely relied on the residual clause	Government argued sentencing may have relied on force clause or other predicates; record inconclusive	Movant must show by a preponderance that the residual clause led to the enhancement (Walker standard); Golinveaux failed to meet it
If the record is inconclusive, may the court assess the legal environment at sentencing to determine reliance on the residual clause?	Golinveaux did not contest reviewing background legal environment but argued current law shows her robbery conviction is not a predicate	Government urged courts may look to controlling precedent at sentencing to infer reliance without remand	Court may consider the background legal environment at the time of sentencing to determine whether reliance on the residual clause was likely; appellate court resolved it here without remand
Whether Iowa second-degree robbery (Iowa Code § 711.1(1)) qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA force clause at the time of sentencing	Golinveaux argued subsections are alternative means and current law may render the conviction non-qualifying under force clause (Mathis/Jones/Johnson line)	Government argued the conviction was under the assault alternative and, under Eighth Circuit precedent, assault under Iowa law involved violent physical force qualifying under the force clause	Court held the robbery conviction implicated assault (§ 708.1(1) or (3)) and, under the law at sentencing, qualified under the ACCA force clause; it also qualifies under current law, so it counts as a predicate
Whether any Johnson error would be harmless even if the residual clause was used	Golinveaux maintained the residual clause may have been used and that current law may invalidate her third predicate	Government argued she still has three qualifying predicates (two conceded + Iowa robbery) so sentence would remain the same	Any error would be harmless because she has at least three qualifying prior convictions; § 2255 relief denied

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (invalidating ACCA residual clause)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Johnson rule retroactive on collateral review)
Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2018) (movant must prove by preponderance that residual clause led enhancement)
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir.) (discussing record and use of background legal environment)
Cravens v. United States, 894 F.3d 891 (harmless-error framework for Johnson error in § 2255 collateral review)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (harmless-error standard on collateral review)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (state statute divisible vs. indivisible; alternative means vs. alternative elements)
United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir.) (Iowa assault involves physical force for ACCA/sentencing force clauses)
Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501 (8th Cir.) (harmless error where predicates remain under current law)