Palma v. CHRIBRAN CO., LLC
327 S.W.3d 866
Tex. App.2010Background
- Palmas purchased a newly constructed home in October 2005 from Supreme Builders.
- Joe Palma observed water weeping from street and driveway expansion joints and pooling in lots’ water meter recesses; water also welled up on another street’s lots.
- Chribran Company, L.L.C. (the developer) built a pond in 2004 without a liner or water barrier, allegedly allowing migrating pond water to affect lower elevations.
- Palmas filed suit in October 2007 against Chribran and Teas Lakes Owners Association, asserting five claims including Water Code § 11.086 violation, negligence, nuisance, and negligent trespass; damages sought up to $1,000,000.
- Chribran moved for no-evidence summary judgment under Rule 166a(i); Palmas responded arguing causation evidence was sufficient.
- Trial court granted Chribran’s no-evidence motion; Palmas’ claims were severed as to Chribran after judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether causation-in-fact evidence was adequate. | Palmas rely on Joe Palma’s affidavit linking pond to damages. | Joe’s lay testimony is insufficient; no expert hydrology evidence shows causation. | No genuine issue; lay causation evidence insufficient; grant affirmed. |
| Whether the Palmas could defeat a no-evidence motion without expert testimony on hydrology. | Common experience shows water from the pond migrates to Palmas’ lot. | Lay opinion about subsurface water movement is not competent evidence. | Expert testimony required; no evidence of causation; judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) (no-evidence standard; burden to raise fact issues)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) (more-than-a-scintilla standard for summary judgment evidence)
- City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) (basis for evidentiary sufficiency in expert-opinion context)
- Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995) (causation-in-fact requirement in torts)
- IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004) (causation and substantial-factor analysis in torts)
- Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2007) (lay testimony limits and basis for expert necessity)
- Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969) (common-experience causation limits for lay testimony)
- Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970) (jury may decide some causation questions by common experience)
- Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977) (expert testimony required where treatment mode is at issue)
- Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984) (lay testimony can establish causation in certain exposure cases)
- Kneten Ins. Co. of N. Am. v., 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969) (causation standards in workers’ compensation context)