Paek v. Attorney General of the United States
793 F.3d 330
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- Ka A. Paek, a South Korean national, was admitted to the U.S. on June 5, 1991 as a conditional lawful permanent resident (Conditional LPR) based on his mother's qualifying marriage.
- In July 2000 Paek’s status was adjusted to a non-conditional lawful permanent resident (Non-conditional LPR).
- In 2005–2006 Paek was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree robbery, an offense the parties agree is an aggravated felony.
- In removal proceedings Paek applied for adjustment of status and a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility; the Immigration Judge held Paek ineligible under § 212(h)’s aggravated-felony bar because his conviction occurred after his admission as a Conditional LPR.
- The BIA, in a published decision, affirmed: a person admitted as a Conditional LPR qualifies as “an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” for purposes of the § 212(h) aggravated-felony bar. Paek petitioned for review in the Third Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission as a Conditional LPR counts as being "previously admitted ... as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" for INA § 212(h)’s aggravated-felony bar | Paek: Conditional status is not truly “permanent”; therefore his initial admission was not admission as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and the aggravated-felony bar does not apply | Government/BIA: INA and implementing provisions treat Conditional LPRs as having obtained lawful permanent resident status (albeit subject to conditions); therefore the aggravated-felony bar applies | The court held Conditional LPRs are "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" under the statutory definition, so the § 212(h) aggravated-felony bar applies; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (dicta treating conditional LPRs as equivalent to full LPRs except where § 216 imposes additional obligations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009) (statutory interpretation begins with plain text and context)
- Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (explicit statutory definitions control ordinary meaning)
- Hanif v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing unlawful entry from admission for purposes of aggravated-felony bar)