Packer v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, Department of State, State Board of Nursing
99 A.3d 965
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2014Background
- Petitioners Angela Packer and Hope Murphy, both R.N.s, pleaded guilty to felony violations of the Drug Act and the Department of State’s prosecuting attorney filed petitions for automatic suspension under The Professional Nursing Law (the Law).
- The State Board of Nursing issued automatic suspension orders (and later final orders) directing cessation of practice and return of credentials; Petitioners did not request hearings challenging the convictions and therefore did not contest the factual basis for suspension.
- The Board relied on Section 15.1(b) (automatic suspension), Section 15.2 (reinstatement/reapplication rules), and Section 6(c) (10-year disqualification for issuance of license after Drug Act felony) to treat suspended licensees as disqualified from seeking return of practice rights until statutory conditions (including a ten-year period) were met.
- Petitioners argued the Board misinterpreted the Law: automatic suspensions under 15.1(b) are silent as to duration and should be governed by Section 15 (which vests the Board with discretion to reissue suspended licenses), not by Section 15.2 or Section 6(c), so the Board should retain discretion (and could approve shorter stayed suspensions or consent decrees).
- The Board replied that the phrase in 15.1(b) — "restoration ... shall be made as hereinafter provided in the case of revocation or suspension" — points to Section 15.2 (the immediately following provision), which triggers Section 6(c)’s ten-year limitation for issuance of a license; the Board adopted a uniform, non-discretionary application across health boards in 2013.
- The Commonwealth Court found Section 15.1(b) ambiguous, declined to defer to the Board’s new policy as a matter of administrative deference (no formal rulemaking), but applied statutory-construction principles and concluded the Board’s harmonizing interpretation of Sections 15.1(b), 15.2, and 6(c) was reasonable and affirmed the suspensions and the ten-year barrier to reacquisition of active practice rights.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioners' Argument | Board's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether automatic suspensions under §15.1(b) are governed by §15 (Board discretion) or by §15.2/§6(c) (statutory waiting and qualification rules) | §15.1(b) is silent as to duration; §15 (which allows reissuance in the Board’s discretion) governs restoration of suspended licenses | The "hereinafter" language in §15.1(b) points to §15.2 (immediately following), which invokes §6(c) and its ten‑year disqualification | Court held §15.1(b) ambiguous and adopted Board’s harmonizing reading that §15.2 and §6(c) apply, supporting the ten‑year restriction |
| Whether the Court must defer to the Board’s new interpretive policy absent formal rulemaking | Deference not warranted because the Board has not adopted the interpretation via formal rulemaking and had historically allowed consent agreements | Agency expertise supports deference where statute ambiguous; Board contends consistent application across health boards is proper | Court declined Chevron‑level deference due to lack of formal or longstanding adjudicatory interpretation but resolved ambiguity via statutory‑construction tools and upheld Board’s reading |
| Whether treating suspended licensees under §15.1(b) like initial applicants (ten‑year rule) unlawfully penalizes licensees or renders §15 superfluous | Petitioners: licensed individuals retain a property interest; legislative text distinctions (reissue/restoration vs reinstatement) show intent to preserve Board discretion and not to impose a blanket ten‑year bar | Board: automatic suspensions remove discretion because circumstances are serious; harmonized reading avoids inconsistent treatment across professions | Court rejected petitioners’ arguments; found Board’s interpretation reasonable and not absurd or superfluous |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency regulations reflecting reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statute are entitled to deference)
- Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (informal agency interpretations merit respect but not Chevron deference)
- Velocity Express v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 853 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (agency interpretation of ambiguous statute generally accorded deference unless erroneous or frustrating legislative intent)
- Rosen v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 763 A.2d 962 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (agency interpretation not entitled to deference if it frustrates legislative intent)
- Brown v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 566 A.2d 913 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (licensee retains a property interest in a suspended license)