Pablo v. Leader, 656 B.R. 459

In August 2017 Catalina Estillado, an ABC Polymer machine operator, became entangled in high‑speed rollers while cutting a "wrap" and died; no witness to the accident.
ABC's written safety policy required guards, but the plant routinely operated with a barrier guard raised so operators could cut wraps while rollers ran; prior serious injuries had occurred from that practice.
Dean E. Leader was ABC's Vice President of Operations; he oversaw safety programs historically but testified he had limited day‑to‑day plant involvement, did not train machine operators, and had not met Estillado.
A state court found Leader (and others) engaged in "willful conduct" under Ala. Code §25‑5‑11(c)(2) by failing to install a limit switch and training/allowing guards to be bypassed, entering a $3,000,000 judgment now on appeal.
Leader filed Chapter 7 in 2022; Plaintiff sought a determination that the state judgment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury).
The bankruptcy court held the Alabama "willful conduct" finding was not preclusive for §523(a)(6) willfulness and concluded Plaintiff failed to prove willful or malicious injury; the state judgment was discharged.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Collateral estoppel effect of state "willful conduct" finding	State‑court finding that Leader committed "willful conduct" under Ala. Code §25‑5‑11(c)(2) should preclude relitigation of willfulness under §523(a)(6)	Alabama "willful conduct" statute does not require intent to injure and thus is not identical to §523(a)(6)'s willful‑injury element	Not preclusive — state definition of "willful conduct" differs from bankruptcy "willful" (intent to cause injury)
Willfulness under §523(a)(6)	Leader's failure to install a limit switch and his role in training/allowing guard‑bypass made death substantially certain	Leader had limited plant involvement, no authority over operators, did not train Estillado, and lacked intent to harm	Plaintiff failed to prove willful injury — no evidence Leader intended injury or that death was substantially certain
Malice under §523(a)(6)	Avoiding shutdowns/production motive shows wrongful, excessive conduct amounting to malice	Conduct, if negligent or reckless, was not done with malice or a depraved disregard for others' rights	No actual or implied malice proven; conduct was at most reckless/non‑malicious
Dischargeability of state judgment	State judgment should be nondischargeable under §523(a)(6)	Judgment should be discharged in bankruptcy	Judgment against Leader discharged; bankruptcy judgment entered for defendant

Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (willful for §523(a)(6) means actual intent to cause injury)
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (plaintiff bears burden of proof by preponderance in nondischargeability actions)
In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061 (collateral estoppel prerequisites in bankruptcy context)
In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161 (distinguishing willful from reckless conduct for §523(a)(6))
In re Jennings, 670 F.3d 1329 (substantial‑certainty formulation of willfulness)
In re Kane, 755 F.3d 1285 (discussion of subjective vs. objective substantial‑certainty standards)
In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986 (malice may be implied but requires sufficient degree of wrongdoing)
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (classic definition of malice in tort context)
Bailey v. Hogg, 547 So.2d 498 (Alabama §25‑5‑11(c)(2) requires no intent to injure for "willful conduct")
Haisten v. Audubon Indem. Co., 642 So.2d 404 (Alabama law: no subjective intent to injure required under §25‑5‑11(c)(2))
In re Monson, [citation="661 F. App'x 675"] (reckless conduct insufficient to establish §523(a)(6) willful and malicious injury)