In this appeal, we decide whether an employer’s failure to obtain statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance constitutes a willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The district court held that such failure was not a willful and malicious injury; thus, the employer’s resulting debt to an injured employee was dischargeable in bankruptcy. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Debtor-appellee Keith Walker hired creditor-appellant Frank Hope to perform construction work on a house. . In the course of his employment, Hope fell from a height of eight feet and broke his forearm and elbow, resulting in medical expenses, lost wages, and permanent partial disability. Although Georgia state law requires general contractors to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for their subcontractors, 1 Walker had failed to obtain such coverage by the time of Walker’s accident. Walker claims that he did not insure his workers because he did not consider himself the general contractor for the construction project and because he believed that Hope and his coworkers were responsible for securing their own insurance.
Hope sued Walker for compensation for his injuries, and the State Board of Workers’ Compensation awardеd Hope $27,939.41 in temporary and permanent partial disability benefits, medical costs, mileage, attorneys’ fees, interest, and penalties, plus reasonable future medical costs related to Hope’s inju-ríes. After paying a fraction of the ordered amount, Walker filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Hope countered with a complaint requesting that his award be declared non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(а)(6) as a debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court dismissed Hope’s claim, reasoning that Walker’s failure to obtain insurance was not the direct cause of Hope’s injuriеs and citing the policy of strictly construing exceptions to discharge. The district ■ court affirmed for the same reasons.
II. DISCUSSION
A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving pаrty has “failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Section 523(a)(6) of thе Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge in bankruptcy “any debt ... for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We have interpreted “willful” to require “a shоwing of an intentional or deliberate act, which is not done merely in reckless disregard of the rights of another.”
Lee v. Ikner (In re Ikner),
It is undisputed that Walker’s failure to obtain insurance was a willful act in that it was not the result of an accident or inadvertence, but wаs founded upon a putatively mistaken belief. Thus, the central issue in this case is whether a deliberate and intentional
act
that results in injury may constitute a “willful and malicious
injury”
under section 523(a)(6), or whether the debt- or must intend the actual injury before the resulting debt may be nondischargeable. The majority of circuits that have addressed this issue have strictly interpreted section 523(a)(6) to require that the debtor either intend the resulting injury or intentionаlly take action that is substantially certain to cause the injury.
3
Only the Ninth Circuit has held that an intent to do the act at issue-is sufficient to render the resulting injury “willful” under section 523(a)(6).
Britton v. Price (In re Britton),
We follow our sister courts in concluding that, in order to be “willful” under section 523(a)(6), the debtor must have intended more than merely the act that results in injury. Congress has been very clear in expressing its intention in section 523(a)(6). The plain language оf section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from “willful and malicious injury” rather than “willful and malicious acts which cause an injury.”
Eaves v. Hampel (In re Hampel),
As the Third Circuit noted in
Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte),
Hope’s secondary argument is that his true injury was the loss of his statutory right to workers’ compensation insurance protection. Thus, because Hope’s economic injury was a necessary and direсt result of Walker’s failure to obtain such coverage, Walker must have intended that economic injury. There is some support for this view among the. bankruptcy courts.
See, e.g., Strauss v. Zielinski (In re Strauss),
More importantly, this type of “injury” is nothing more than a recasting of the “reckless disregard” standard expressly rejected by Congress and by this court.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Wrenn (In re Wrenn),
III. CONCLUSION
Hope argues that Walker’s intentional failure to obtain statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” under section 523(a)(6). We conclude that Walker did not intend to *1166 injure Hope and that Hope’s physical injuries were not substantially certain to occur as a result of Walker’s failure to act. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss Hope’s claim on summary judgment-
Notes
. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8. Refusal or willful neglect to obtain workers' compensation insurance where required is a misdemeanor. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-126.
. The distinction between an intentional act and an intentional injury, while critical tо the present case, was not at issue in
In re Ikner.
Thus, we do not consider our use of the word “act” in
In re Ikner,
.
See, e.g., Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte),