851 F.3d 677
7th Cir.2017Background
- Jacob Ostby, diagnosed with ADHD and Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, has received IEPs since preschool and exhibited ongoing behavioral challenges requiring special-education services.
- In 2014 the District proposed moving Jacob from general education to a restrictive out-of-district program (the SELF program) for first grade; the parents objected and filed a due-process complaint invoking IDEA’s stay-put provision.
- While the administrative process proceeded, stay-put kept Jacob in his general-education placement; the administrative decision ultimately favored the District and the parents sued in federal court seeking review.
- During the appeal, the parties reached an agreement on a new IEP placing Jacob in general education for third grade at a different District school; the District no longer intends to place him in the SELF program.
- The parents continued to challenge the District’s earlier decision to place Jacob in the SELF program and sought attorneys’ fees; the district court had awarded reimbursement for private evaluations ($3,126.10), which the District did not appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal challenging Jacob’s first-grade SELF placement is moot | Ostbys: No — relief (including attorneys’ fees) and prospective protection remain available; issue capable of repetition yet evading review | District: Yes — parties agree current IEP places Jacob in general education and there is no present intent to use SELF; no live controversy | Moot. No redressable injury remains; case dismissed as moot except for unreversed monetary award |
| Whether the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception applies | Ostbys: Jacob’s disabilities and annual IEP revisions make repeat placement likely; Honig controls | District: Concedes short duration but denies reasonable expectation of repeat placement given current agreement and lack of intent | Exception does not apply — possibility of future SELF placement speculative; factual agreement defeats reasonable expectation |
| Whether plaintiffs can obtain attorneys’ fees despite mootness | Ostbys: Fees available under IDEA; plaintiffs can be prevailing parties even without live claims | District: Buckhannon bars fees when defendant voluntarily changes conduct absent enforceable judgment or consent decree | Fees denied on appeal — court cannot adjudicate prevailing-party status because merits are moot; voluntary/informal relief does not confer prevailing-party status |
| Scope of remand / surviving claims | Ostbys: Seek review and relief on prior IEP and fees; reimbursement award should stand | District: Does not appeal reimbursement award | Reimbursement for private evaluations remains intact; all other relief vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (exception to mootness where future harm is reasonably expected and challenged action is short in duration)
- Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) (Article III requires a continuing personal stake at all stages)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (prevailing-party status requires enforceable judgment or court-ordered change, not voluntary change)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (prevailing-party analysis and meaning of relief on merits)
- Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) (IEP disputes often moot after student progresses; advisory-opinion concerns)
- Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (speculative future placement attempts insufficient to avoid mootness; required something more than possibility)
- Nathan R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 199 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 1999) (IDEA prevailing-party and fee issues; interim relief does not confer prevailing-party status)
- Steven L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Downers Grove Dist. 58, 89 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 1996) (mootness in IDEA cases and limits on appellate review)
- Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016) (describes limited scope of the repetition-evading-review exception to mootness)