Orvil Hassebrock v. Robert Bernhoft
815 F.3d 334
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Orvil and Evelyn Hassebrock sued their former law firm (Bernhoft) and two accountants for negligence, legal/accounting malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting, claiming faulty tax returns and mishandled civil claims.
- The district court set a discovery cutoff of May 10, 2014 (via a magistrate minute order); the parties previously discussed expert deadlines but the court-controlled discovery deadline governed the schedule.
- The Hassebrocks did not disclose an expert or his written report before the May 10 discovery cutoff; they filed belated motions (April 9 and May 13) asking to disclose late and cited reliance on Rule 26’s 90‑day default or lack of funds to pay an expert.
- The magistrate judge denied the motions and refused to extend the discovery/expert-disclosure deadline; the district judge, reviewing the magistrate’s order, affirmed and excluded the expert under Rule 37(c)(1).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the district court granted it because, under Illinois law, professional-negligence claims require expert proof of the standard of care (no expert = no ability to prove claims), and the Hassebrocks did not meet an exception (e.g., common-knowledge).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 26(a)(2)(D)’s 90‑day default expert deadline governed instead of the court’s discovery cutoff | Hassebrock: Rule 26’s 90‑day default applied, so expert disclosure due June 3, 2014 | Defendants: Court’s scheduling order/discovery cutoff controls expert deadlines | Court: The court’s scheduling order controls; Rule 26’s default is subordinate to court orders — denial affirmed |
| Whether the magistrate/district court abused discretion in excluding the late expert under Rule 37(c)(1) | Hassebrock: Late disclosure was justified by reliance on Rule 26 and by inability to pay expert (excusable neglect) | Defendants: Late disclosure was neither substantially justified nor harmless; reopening discovery prejudices defendants | Court: No abuse of discretion; delay was unjustified and prejudicial — exclusion proper |
| Whether professional‑negligence, malpractice, and related claims can proceed without expert testimony under the common‑knowledge exception | Hassebrock: Some claims (e.g., failure to pursue Semper Libera claim) are obvious and fall within common-knowledge exception | Defendants: Standard of care requires expert proof; no facts show negligence so obvious to non‑experts | Court: Hassebrocks waived the argument and in any event failed to produce evidence that negligence was within common knowledge — exception does not apply |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on all claims (including contract, fiduciary, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting) absent an expert | Hassebrock: Some claims are distinct and may not need expert proof | Defendants: These claims are derivative of professional‑care obligations and require expert proof | Court: All claims depend on demonstrating professional standard of care; without expert testimony they fail — summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2013) (discovery‑order review is for abuse of discretion)
- Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Fox Television Holdings, 767 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2014) (excusable‑neglect analysis for late filings)
- Zuppardi v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 770 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2014) (de novo review for summary‑judgment legal questions)
- Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009 (Ill. 1996) (professional‑negligence standard and requirement of expert testimony)
- Hoagland ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004) (contract claims tied to professional standard cannot evade expert requirement)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (nonmoving party must present evidence beyond pleadings to survive summary judgment)