Orlando Vasquez-Valle v. Jefferson Sessions, III, 899 F.3d 834

Orlando Vasquez-Valle, a Mexican national and long-term U.S. resident with a U.S. citizen spouse and children, pled guilty in Oregon to witness tampering under Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.285 and was placed in immigration removal proceedings.
DHS charged removability based on unlawful presence and a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT); Vasquez-Valle conceded removability on presence but contested the CIMT designation to seek cancellation of removal.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded the Oregon witness-tampering statute constituted a CIMT, analogizing it to obstruction-of-justice offenses and interpreting the statute as requiring conscious wrongdoing.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo (declining BIA Skidmore deference) and assessed whether § 162.285 is categorically a CIMT under the categorical/modified categorical framework.
The court found § 162.285 overbroad because Oregon applies it to non-fraudulent, non-depraved conduct (citing Oregon decisions like State v. McBeth and others), and held the statute divisible into subsections (a) and (b).
The conviction record showed Vasquez-Valle was convicted under § 162.285(1)(b) (inducing an already-summoned witness to be absent); the court held even subsection (b) is not a categorical CIMT. Petition granted and remanded.

Issue	Vasquez-Valle's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether ORS § 162.285 is categorically a CIMT	§ 162.285 criminalizes non-fraudulent, non-depraved conduct and thus is overbroad	The statute’s intent-to-interfere with justice makes it a CIMT, like obstruction offenses	Not categorical: statute is overbroad; not all conduct meets CIMT definition
Whether § 162.285 is divisible	Statute’s subsections (a) and (b) set out alternative elements and thus are divisible	The statute defines one crime with alternative language, not divisible for categorical analysis	Divisible: (a) and (b) have different elements and are treated separately in Oregon law
Whether conviction tracked subsection (a) or (b) under modified categorical approach	Identify which subsection basis from record; petitioner argued (b) applied	Government argued statute not divisible or that conviction reflected CIMT regardless	Record (indictment and plea) tracked subsection (b): inducing summoned witness to be absent
Whether subsection (b) is a categorical CIMT under modified categorical approach	Subsection (b) can be applied to non-fraudulent, non-depraved conduct and thus is not a CIMT	Subsection (b) evinces corrupt intent to disrupt government function and is a CIMT	Subsection (b) is not a categorical CIMT; conviction does not render petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal

Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir.) (describing two-step categorical approach for CIMTs)
Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzalez, 465 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (categorical/modified categorical framework explained)
Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir.) (holding misprision-like offense not a CIMT)
Escobar v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (California witness tampering statute found not a categorical CIMT)
Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir.) (fraud requires false statement to obtain tangible benefit)
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.) (non-fraudulent CIMTs generally involve intent to harm or actual harm)
Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.) (statute divisible when it lists alternative elements/means)
Martinez-Lopez v. United States, 864 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir.) (modified categorical approach; permissible documents)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (documents permitted for modified categorical inquiry)