Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
860 F.3d 1228
9th Cir.2017Background
- The DEA issued two administrative subpoenas in 2012 to the Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) seeking a patient’s and two physicians’ prescription records maintained by the PDMP.
- Oregon sued for a declaratory judgment that, under Oregon law (Or. Rev. Stat. § 431A.865), the DEA must obtain a federal court order before enforcing subpoenas for PDMP records; Oregon did not assert a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
- The ACLU of Oregon and five individuals intervened, asserting a Fourth Amendment claim that the DEA must obtain a probable-cause warrant before accessing PDMP records and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to that effect.
- The district court allowed intervention, reached the Fourth Amendment merits, and held the DEA’s administrative subpoenas violated privacy interests; it did not decide federal preemption.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed: it held intervenors lacked Article III standing to pursue relief different from Oregon’s and independently ruled Oregon’s state-law court-order requirement is preempted by the federal administrative subpoena statute, 21 U.S.C. § 876.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intervenors must establish Article III standing to pursue relief different from plaintiff | Intervenors argued Rule 24(a) intervention sufficed; no independent standing needed | DEA argued intervenors must show Article III standing for relief different from Oregon’s | Intervenors must show independent Article III standing when seeking relief different from plaintiff (following Town of Chester) |
| Whether intervenors had standing to bring a Fourth Amendment warrant claim | Intervenors claimed imminent threat of disclosure of their PDMP records and present burdens from that risk | DEA argued subpoenas targeted specific non-intervenor records; injury was speculative | Intervenors lacked standing; alleged injuries were speculative and not certainly impending (Clapper principles) |
| Whether Oregon’s statutory requirement that disclosure occur only pursuant to a probable-cause court order is preempted by the CSA subpoena scheme | Oregon contended it could require judicial review/court order before disclosing PDMP records (except probable cause rule admitted preempted) | DEA argued 21 U.S.C. § 876 authorizes administrative subpoenas enforceable without prior court order and § 431A.865 conflicts with that scheme | Oregon’s court-order requirement is preempted: § 431A.865 stands as an obstacle to § 876’s administrative-subpoena scheme; DEA may use subpoenas and invoke § 876(c) enforcement if resisted |
| Availability of relief for PDMP privacy concerns (scope of decision) | Intervenors sought injunctive relief requiring warrants for PDMP access | DEA argued relief must be limited to plaintiff’s claims; enforcement procedure under § 876(c) remains available to contest subpoenas | Court reversed district court, dismissed intervenors’ Fourth Amendment claim for lack of standing, and preempted Oregon’s statutory court-order requirement while noting Oregon can still contest subpoenas via § 876(c) enforcement process |
Key Cases Cited
- Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (standing requires plaintiff-specific showing)
- Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (standing must be shown for each claim and form of relief)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (injury-in-fact and imminence requirements)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (CSA objectives and enforcement scheme)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (allegations of speculative future injury insufficient for standing)
- Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (conflict preemption / obstacle test)
- Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (examining federal statute’s purpose for preemption analysis)
- Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (preemption and interference with federal objectives)
