Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC
546 S.W.3d 133
| Tex. | 2018Background
- Chaparral Energy contracted (and paid $22,327) for Oncor to construct facilities and provide electric service to two wells; Oncor promised a schedule but did not deliver a definitive installation schedule.
- Oncor delayed obtaining needed easements until ~13 months later; Chaparral alleges Oncor falsely represented progress and spent >$300,000 on generators/fuel.
- Chaparral sued Oncor in district court for breach of contract; a jury awarded damages and fees; Oncor appealed and later argued the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction.
- The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment; this Court granted review to decide whether the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Public Utility Commission (PUC).
- The core legal question: Does PURA's grant of exclusive original jurisdiction over an electric utility's "rates, operations, and services" require administrative exhaustion before Chaparral may pursue breach-of-contract damages in district court?
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PURA grants the PUC exclusive jurisdiction over Chaparral's breach-of-contract claim | Chaparral: claim is a private contract/damages action that does not require PUC expertise or usurp PUC functions | Oncor: PURA §32.001 gives PUC exclusive original jurisdiction over rates, operations, and services, and Chaparral's claim concerns "services" | Held: PURA grants exclusive jurisdiction; Chaparral's claim involves Oncor's services and required administrative exhaustion before suit |
| Whether PURA's §17.157 limits PUC jurisdiction to permissive, concurrent authority over customer disputes | Chaparral: §17.157 uses "may," showing only permissive/concurrent jurisdiction | Oncor: §17.157 concerns PUC procedures for disputes (billing-focused) but does not negate §32.001's exclusive grant | Held: §17.157 does not negate §32.001; read together they support a comprehensive regulatory scheme under which the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction |
| Whether the PUC can provide the requested remedy (monetary damages) — i.e., inadequate-remedy exception to exhaustion | Chaparral: PUC cannot award money damages, so exclusive jurisdiction cannot rest with an agency that cannot give the remedy sought | Oncor: PURA contemplates a two-step process — PUC resolves regulatory issues (tariff interpretation) and courts later adjudicate damages using PUC findings | Held: Inadequate-remedy exception does not apply; claimant must exhaust administrative remedies because judicial damages can follow PUC findings (hybrid process) |
| Whether administrative resolution would unconstitutionally deny open courts and jury trial rights | Chaparral: forcing PUC first abrogates common-law breach remedy and denies jury/inviolate-trial rights | Oncor: issues are regulatory in nature (tariff and service rules) and analogous to administrative matters; jury rights remain for ultimate breach/damages after PUC findings | Held: No constitutional violation; administrative adjudication of regulatory issues is permissible, and jury trial remains for final breach and damages after PUC proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2004) (PURA §32.001 confers exclusive PUC jurisdiction over rates, operations, and services)
- Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (agency may make preliminary findings that courts later use to decide remedies under a hybrid process)
- In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2007) (discussing PURA's comprehensive regulatory scheme and chapter 17 dispute procedures)
- Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (administrative adjudications may not carry jury-trial rights when not analogous to 1876 jury actions)
- David McDavid Nissan, 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (describing substantial-evidence review of agency findings and hybrid adjudication model)
- Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) (noting exhaustion applies only to complaints the Legislature authorized the agency to resolve)
- Hous. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1987) (inadequate-remedy exception where administrative process cannot prevent irreparable harm)
- Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) (subject-matter jurisdiction challenges cannot be waived and may be raised on appeal)
- Tex. Workers' Comp. Com'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995) (historical test for jury-trial right and distinction between bill-of-rights and judiciary-article protections)