Omar v. Rollerson & Rolita N. Burns v. United States, 127 A.3d 1220

Background

On June 18, 2012 two related altercations in Southeast D.C.: an Elvans Road incident (burglary/ADW allegations) and a Bowen Road group assault (victim required stitches).
Rollerson was indicted on multiple counts from the Elvans incident (first-degree burglary while armed, ADW, two counts PFCV, unlawful possession, carrying a dangerous weapon, felony threats) and also charged for the Bowen Road assault; Burns was charged only for the Bowen Road felony assault.
At a joint jury trial Rollerson was convicted on burglary, ADW, both PFCV counts, both felony threats, and felony assault; Burns was convicted of felony assault.
Rollerson sought severance to have Burns testify live at a separate trial to provide exculpatory testimony denying his presence/motive at Elvans; the trial court denied severance but said the government would stipulate instead. Rollerson declined the stipulation and did not present phone records.
The D.C. Court of Appeals found that Burns’s proffered live testimony was substantially exculpatory and that forcing a stipulation (or denying live testimony) prejudiced Rollerson; it reversed and vacated several of his convictions and remanded for retrial on the Elvans-related counts, but affirmed the convictions arising from the Bowen Road assault (counts involving Patterson) and affirmed Burns’s conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by denying Rollerson’s motion to sever so Burns could testify live	Rollerson: Burns would give substantially exculpatory live testimony denying his presence/motive at Elvans; live testimony essential to his defense	Government: Burns’s testimony not essential because Harrington’s testimony and other evidence establish guilt; government willing to stipulate to Burns’s proffer	Held: Abuse of discretion to deny severance; Burns’s proffer was substantially exculpatory; convictions on Elvans counts vacated and remanded for new trial
Whether trial court erred by denying Burns’s motion to sever Elvans counts from Bowen counts	Burns: most evidence related only to Rollerson; joint trial prejudiced her	Government: crimes were part of same spree; limiting instructions could prevent prejudice	Held: No abuse of discretion; limiting instructions and distinct charges prevented manifest prejudice; Burns’s conviction affirmed
Sufficiency of evidence for felony assault (significant bodily injury)	Appellants: injuries (stitches, bruises) insufficient for "significant bodily injury"	Government: victim sustained serious lacerations, required nine stitches and prompt treatment — meets statutory standard	Held: Evidence sufficient; convictions for felony assault (Bowen incident) affirmed
Whether Rollerson’s two PFCV convictions should merge	(Raised on appeal) — merger issue rendered moot if Elvans convictions vacated	Government: N/A given vacatur	Held: Merger issue mooted by reversal of Elvans-related convictions

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782 (D.C. 1974) (framework for severance when co‑defendant’s testimony is exculpatory)
Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587 (D.C. 2005) (co‑defendant’s exculpatory testimony may require severance where government’s case is weak)
Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120 (D.C. 1992) (denial to present co‑defendant testimony that bears on motive prejudicial)
King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348 (D.C. 1988) (importance of live co‑defendant testimony despite credibility issues)
Daniels v. United States, 738 A.2d 240 (D.C. 1999) (one generally cannot be forced to accept a stipulation in place of live testimony)
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (limitations on substituting stipulations for live evidence)
In re R.S., 6 A.3d 854 (D.C. 2010) (definition and threshold for "significant bodily injury" for felony assault)
Blakeney v. United States, 653 A.2d 365 (D.C. 1995) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)