Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City
2011 UT 10
| Utah | 2011Background
- Olsen elected Eagle Mountain mayor in 2005; charged with seven counts of misusing public funds in 2006.
- Olsen resigned before charges were announced; acquitted after a 4-day trial in 2008.
- Olsen hired private counsel for his criminal defense and incurred substantial fees and costs.
- Olsen submitted a written request for reimbursement to Eagle Mountain 34 days after acquittal.
- City did not respond; Olsen filed suit in Fourth District Court seeking reimbursement.
- Court addressed whether Section 902 timing governs reimbursement for criminal actions rather than civil defense requests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 'manner' for reimbursement is limited to Section 902 timing. | Olsen: 'Manner' equals written request; timing not required. | Eagle Mountain: 'Manner' includes Section 902 timing for defending the employee. | Written request only; timing not applicable to criminal reimbursements. |
| Whether Section 902 timing applies to criminal reimbursement requests. | Timing not implicated in criminal context; no service of process. | Timing applies across reimbursement in the statute as integrated with Sections 902/903. | Timing does not apply to criminal reimbursement requests. |
| Whether Section 903 conditions affect criminal reimbursement in this context. | Section 903 should allow reimbursement without extending civil-defense conditions. | Section 903 aligns with civil defense, not criminal reimbursement. | Section 903 does not govern criminal reimbursement; not applicable. |
| Whether incorporating Sections 902/903 wholesale into the Reimbursement Statute is proper. | Incorporation consistent with statutory scheme; timing not required. | Incorporation would improperly expand the statute's reach. | Incorporation not read literally; timing not required for criminal reimbursements. |
| Whether Olsen’s timely filing under Section 78B-2-305(4) supports the claim. | Acquittal-based timing aligns with three-year limitations; proper filing. | No defense-defendant framework; timing is civil-centric. | Filing within applicable statute-of-limitations period; request valid. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980) (manner limited to the mode or method of action)
- Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367 (Utah 1994) (statutory construction guides; avoid adding terms not in text)
- Kimball Condos. Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642 (Utah 1997) (look to plain language and statutory context)
- Day v. Meek, 976 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1999) (context matters for ordinary-language interpretation)
- Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 P.3d 686 (Utah 2002) (statutory language interpreted in light of surrounding text)
- King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991) (context determines statutory meaning; not just isolated words)
- Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010) (review of statutory alignment within the overall scheme)
- CP Nat'l Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981) (words interpreted in light of surrounding text and structure)
- Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662 (Utah 1994) (statutory interpretation within comprehensive scheme)
- NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941) (contextual meaning of terms in statutory framework)