Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173

Background

Darius Clark (respondent) was indicted for multiple child-abuse counts after his girlfriend left her two young children (ages 3 and 18 months) in his care; preschool teachers observed injuries to the 3-year-old (L.P.).
L.P. identified “Dee” (Clark) as his abuser to his teachers; L.P. did not testify at trial because Ohio law found him incompetent due to age.
The trial court admitted L.P.’s out-of-court statements under Ohio hearsay rules (child-victim exception) and ruled they were non‑testimonial under the Sixth Amendment; Clark was convicted.
The Ohio appellate court reversed on Confrontation Clause grounds; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding the teachers’ questioning had the primary purpose of gathering prosecutorial evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether L.P.’s statements to his teachers were “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment and thus barred absent confrontation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether L.P.’s statements to preschool teachers were "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment	Ohio: statements were testimonial because teachers’ questioning aimed to identify the abuser and mandatory reporting made them state agents gathering evidence	Clark: statements were not testimonial — teachers sought to protect the child in an ongoing emergency; mandatory reporting does not convert them into police	Held: Not testimonial; primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency and protect the child, so Confrontation Clause did not bar admission
Whether statements to non‑law‑enforcement persons are categorically outside Confrontation Clause	Ohio: teachers acted like agents of the State due to mandatory reporting; such statements can be testimonial	Clark: individuals who are not principally law‑enforcement are much less likely to elicit testimonial statements	Held: No categorical exclusion; statements to non‑law‑enforcement are less likely to be testimonial and must be assessed under the primary‑purpose test
Whether the child’s age affects testimonial inquiry	Ohio: not determinative; focus is on primary purpose of questioning	Clark: young children rarely understand prosecution, so their statements ordinarily are not testimonial	Held: Age is highly relevant — statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, be testimonial
Role of historical practice at founding in Confrontation analysis	Ohio: not a central focus in this case	Clark: historical practice supports admitting such child statements	Held: Historical evidence shows similar statements were admissible at common law, supporting non‑testimonial conclusion

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (announcing that the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements by nontestifying witnesses unless unavailable and previously cross‑examined)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (establishing the "primary purpose" test: statements made to address an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (instructing courts to consider all relevant circumstances in determining primary purpose)
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (noting Confrontation Clause does not bar statements that were admissible at the time of the founding)
Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (discussing functional equivalence of certain out‑of‑court statements to in‑court testimony)
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (pre‑Crawford reliability framework for admitting hearsay)