45 F.4th 291
D.C. Cir.2022Background
- Powertech sought an NRC source-material license to conduct in situ recovery (ISR) uranium mining at the Dewey-Burdock site in South Dakota; the site overlies uranium-bearing aquifers.
- NRC had a 2009 generic EIS for ISR in the region and prepared a site-specific supplemental EIS for Dewey-Burdock; NRC invited 20 tribes (including the Oglala Sioux) to participate in scoping and surveys.
- NRC conducted a 2013 field survey with seven tribes; the Oglala Sioux refused to participate over methodology and compensation disputes. NRC issued the final EIS and licensed Powertech in 2014, using a programmatic agreement to address properties discovered later.
- The Oglala Sioux intervened before the Atomic Licensing Board, which found some NEPA and NHPA deficiencies (notably lack of individualized NHPA consultation and incomplete treatment of tribal cultural-resource information); the Commission affirmed some findings but left the license in place pending remediation.
- Post-remand, NRC attempted consultations and proposed survey methodologies; negotiations with the Tribe failed. The Licensing Board and Commission concluded the Tribe’s cultural-resource information was effectively unavailable due to the Tribe’s refusal to cooperate, and they found NRC’s remaining NEPA/NHPA procedures reasonable.
- The Tribe petitioned for judicial review; the D.C. Circuit denied the petition, finding NRC’s actions satisfied NEPA and NHPA requirements or that any defects were harmless or cured by public administrative orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tribe) | Defendant's Argument (NRC/Powertech) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to conduct formal NEPA scoping | NRC never performed a formal scoping process and failed to share scoping results with tribes | NRC engaged in notice, meetings, and information gathering that achieved scoping objectives; any formal-scoping omission was harmless | Even if formal scoping was omitted, error was harmless; record shows equivalent outreach and no prejudice to Tribe |
| EIS failure to address Tribe’s cultural resources / unavailability statement | EIS did not explain that tribal cultural-resource information was unavailable per CEQ rule and thus inadequately informed NEPA analysis | Board’s published findings (affirmed by NRC) explained unavailability; those public orders cure any EIS omission | No remand required: Board/Commission orders publicly explained unavailability and satisfied NEPA (supplementation outside EIS can cure defect) |
| Hydrogeologic baseline & boreholes | NRC deferred baseline data collection and left analysis of existing boreholes largely post-license, improperly allowing action before full analysis | EIS analyzed pre-license baseline data, planned for augmenting baselines during staged operations, and addressed impacts of historic boreholes and mitigation | NRC took a sufficient “hard look”; pre-license analysis was adequate and post-license testing was reasonable and not NEPA-defeating |
| Byproduct disposal plan and hearings | License issued without site-specific disposal plan; EIS insufficiently analyzed disposal, alternatives, stranded byproduct risk | Appendix A disposal-plan requirement applies only to former milling sites, not ISR; EIS analyzed disposal methods, transportation, White Mesa as likely facility, and conditioned operations on securing a disposal contract | NRC’s denial of hearing was proper; regulatory text forecloses the Tribe’s legal complaint and EIS analysis sufficiently addressed disposal and mitigation |
| Mitigation analysis | EIS lists mitigation without assessing efficacy; defers mitigation formulation until after licensing | EIS contains extensive mitigation analysis in multiple sections; further development post-EIS is permissible where impacts and measures were analyzed | Mitigation was adequately considered; no NEPA violation for continuing to refine measures after EIS |
Key Cases Cited
- Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (NEPA is procedural and does not mandate particular substantive results)
- Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (courts defer to reasonable agency factual/technical judgments)
- NRDC v. NRC, 879 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (public, post-EIS administrative orders can cure EIS deficiencies and make remand pointless)
- Friends of the River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (supplementation in a public opinion after investigation can obviate remand)
- Oglala Sioux Tribe v. NRC, 896 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (prior remand concerning irreparable-harm standard in this matter)
- Indian River Cnty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 945 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (NEPA requires a ‘hard look’ at reasonably foreseeable impacts)
- New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (failure to analyze effects of no permanent repository violated NEPA)
- Am. Rivers v. FERC, 895 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (agency cannot leave mitigation as merely anticipated and unspecified)
- Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (courts may not accept new agency rationales offered only in litigation)
- Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (harmless-error approach to NEPA procedural deviations)
- Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009) (harmless-error jurisprudence requires case-specific judgment)
- Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (limited exception to Chenery where outcome on remand is indisputably clear)
