Ochoa v. Workman
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 986
10th Cir.2012Background
- Ochoa was sentenced to death for two counts of first-degree murder in Oklahoma and pursued Atkins-based mental-retardation claims.
- OCCA held trial on whether Ochoa was mentally retarded, finding he did not prove retardation by a preponderance.
- Ochoa filed a second § 2254 petition arguing Oklahoma’s static-definition approach to retardation and related procedures violated Atkins.
- The district court denied relief; this court reviews under § 2254(d) and § 2244(b).
- OCCA adopted a static view of mental retardation; Ochoa contends a fluid view focusing on time of offense is required by Atkins.
- Ochoa also contends trial conduct (jury knowledge of prior conviction, orange prison attire, shock sleeve) burdened fundamental fairness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Temporal focus of retardation determination | Ochoa: retardation should be judged at time of crime | OCCA: retardation is static; focus at trial sufficient | Not contrary to Atkins; retardation deemed static under state law |
| Fundamental fairness of trial conduct | Shock sleeve, prison attire, and prior-conviction evidence violated due process | Evidence and attire did not render trial fundamentally unfair; any errors were harmless | No reversible error; limited evidence and attire issues found harmless |
| § 2244(b)(2)(A) procedural-irregularity claims | Procedural irregularities are Atkins claims and properly raised in second petition | State: standard § 2244(b) procedures apply; some claims not Atkins-based | Procedural-irregularity claims are Atkins-based and properly before the court |
| Merits of shock sleeve visibility | Shock sleeve visible to jury prejudiced outcome | Record shows sleeve not shown to jury; prejudice not shown | If not visible, prejudice not established; error deemed harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (death eligibility for mentally retarded capital defendants; framework for states to define retardation)
- Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (U.S. 2009) (limitation on providing procedural guidance where Atkins left questions to states)
- Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (U.S. 2005) (states may modify procedures for Atkins claims; federal court defers to state processes)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (visible restraints during trial require justification; broad rule for Deck applicability)
- Lambert v. State, 71 P.3d 30 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (limits on irrelevant evidence in retardation trials; focus on mental retardation)
- Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005) (court treated retardation as static for temporal focus questions)
- Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc; discusses fluid vs static retardation definitions)
- Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1993) (permanent, relatively static nature of mental retardation)
- Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (U.S. 1976) (jury voir dire and appearance in jail clothing; necessity of compulsion for due process)